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Abstract
We explore the consequences of losing confidence in the price-stability objective of central banks
by quantifying the inflation and deflationary biases in inflation expectations. In a model with
an occasionally binding zero-lower-bound constraint, we show that both inflation bias and defla-
tionary bias can exist as a steady-state outcome. We assess the predictions of this model using
unique individual-level inflation expectations data across nine countries that allow for a direct
identification of these biases. Both inflation and deflationary biases are present and sizable, but
different across countries. Even among the euro-area countries, perceptions of the European
Central Bank’s objectives are very distinct.
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1. Introduction
The potential existence of inflation bias has structurally shaped central bank policies for the past
three decades. While traditionally policy makers focused on preventing high inflation, more recently,
the deflationary bias has also attracted a lot of attention, due to the occasionally binding effective
lower bound on the interest rate. If economic agents lose confidence in the monetary authority
pursuing its price stability objective, their inflation expectations may start deviating from the
announced medium-term goals, making it more challenging for a central bank to fulfill its mandate.
For the case of higher inflation expectations (inflation bias) this was formalized by Barro and Gordon
(1983a, 1983b) and Kydland and Prescott (1977) and for the case of lower inflation expectations,
when the economy operates at the zero lower bound (ZLB), (Krugman, 1998; Eggertsson, 2006).
Nakov (2008) and Nakata and Schmidt (2018) show that deflationary bias can also occur away from
the ZLB in the presence of an occasionally binding ZLB constraint.
In this paper we develop a model that can accommodate both inflation and deflationary biases
and empirically test the existence of these biases using a unique individual level data. In the model
both biases can occur when the monetary authority is subject to an occasionally binding ZLB
constraint and when the perceptions of the monetary authority’s objective functions—in particular
regarding the cyclical position of the economy—do not coincide with the optimal policy. We show
that the deflationary bias exists as long as economic agents attach a positive probability to either a
negative demand or a supply shock, pushing the economy to the ZLB. One particularly appealing
interpretation of such a shock is a trust shock that acts as a demand shock (Bursian and Faia,
2018) but, in general, could be any adverse demand or supply shock. In this simple environment,
we formally prove that, as long as households attach a positive probability that such a shock
materializes, deflationary bias exists—that is, inflation expectations are below the target level.
Conversely, when the perception of the target level for output gap is positive, inflation expectations
are above the target level.1 The model also allows us to explore whether conservative (Rogoff, 1985)
or inflation-targeting central banks reduce the magnitude of inflation and deflationary biases.
We test the predictions of the model, by utilizing a novel individual level data in nine different
countries with approximately 85,000 observations. We show that both inflation and deflationary
biases are present and sizable in households’ inflation expectations. Previous research either shows
indirect evidence of inflation bias (among others, Romer, 1993, Ireland, 1999) or identifies a bias in
inflation expectations, but cannot claim that it is due to losing confidence in the central bank’s price
objective (among others, Ehrmann et al., 2017 or Souleles, 2004). In contrast, our survey allows
us to directly observe the confidence of agents in the central bank achieving the objective of price
stability. Furthermore, instead of considering one-year-ahead expectations only, our survey contains
five-year-ahead inflation expectations, mapping closer the medium-run horizon centrals banks have
in mind. In our model losing confidence is either a product of believing that the economy could
be pushed to the ZLB or that the central bank is pursuing a positive output gap target. As a
consequence, inflation expectations deviate from the inflation target of the central bank resulting in
1Alternatively, they could perceive asymmetric preferences of the central bank over the business cycle. The effect
would be isomorphic. See Ruge-Murcia (2003), Gerlach (2003), and Cukierman and Gerlach (2003).
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inflation or deflationary bias. Hence, we estimate the implications of losing confidence in achieving
the price objective on inflation expectations.
Our estimates show that losing confidence in the price objective increases medium-run inflation
expectations by on average 1 percentage point and short-run expectations by about 1/3 percentage
point. Previous empirical evidence on inflation bias relied on testing various implications of the
Barro and Gordon (1983a, 1983b) and Kydland and Prescott (1977) models using either the U.S.
time series data or a cross-country panel. Romer (1993) tests whether more open economies have
lower average inflation, as unexpected monetary expansion leads to real exchange depreciation that
mitigates more of the effects of monetary expansion. He finds a strong evidence of the link between
openness and inflation and, therefore, concludes in support of the time inconsistency models. Ireland
(1999) shows that there exists a cointegrating relationship between unemployment and inflation
in the United States: The magnitude of inflation bias becomes higher when the natural rate of
unemployment rises.2
We also provide evidence of the existence of a deflationary bias. Our estimate of the deflationary
bias is on average -2/3 percentage point for medium-run expectations and -1/3 percentage point for
short-run expectations. For a comparison, Hills et al. (2016) quantifies the deflationary bias within
a calibrated DSGE model that matches some of the key features of the U.S. economy up to 45 basis
points. In addition, we do not find evidence that inflation and deflationary biases are mitigated
in inflation targeting countries. The deflationary bias may be even larger when the central bank
pursues inflation targeting and price stability is the primary objective. However, we observe that
countries who pursue inflation targeting experience lower inflation expectations and lower dispersion
of inflation expectations at the same time. Mertens and Williams (2018) study the effects of the ZLB
on the distribution of inflation expectations and interest rates using options data. They find that
the decrease in the natural rate of interest leads to a model-consistent effects on forecast densities
for interest rates, but the effect on the densities of inflation expectations is more modest.
For the effective conduct of monetary policy within the monetary union member states should
share the same perceptions about the central bank objectives. However, there has been evidence
that there is a heterogeneity in the perception of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) policy across
member states.3 Using our data and based on the identification from the model, we can infer the
average differences across euro-area countries’ perceptions regarding the ECB’s objective function.
The empirical results suggest that Germany, Austria, and France have both inflation and deflation-
ary biases, Spain has only the deflationary bias, and Italy has only the inflation bias. Our model
suggests that these differences can be either due to different perceptions of the target level of the
output gap or a different relative weight attached to output and inflation in the perception of the
2Also using the U.S. time series data, Ruge-Murcia (2003) empirically compares different models that result in
an inflation bias. His empirical test suggests that the data prefer the restrictions from the model with asymmetric
preferences over those arising from the standard Barro-Gordon model. Ruge-Murcia (2004) performs a cross-country
evaluation of the asymmetric preference models by evaluating whether the bias is proportional to the conditional
variance of the unemployment rate, and finds supporting evidence for the United States and France. Finally, Surico
(2008) presents evidence that the inflation bias was positive and significant in the 1960s and ’70s, while it was not
significant in the subsequent period.
3This is highlighted in, e.g., Goldberg and Klein (2011) as well as in several speeches by central bank officials (see
e.g., Cœure´, 2019).
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ECB’s loss function. Specifically, the model implies that when you increase the target level of out-
put, the deflationary bias decreases and the inflation bias increases. However, when you increase
the weight on output relative to inflation in the loss function, both inflation and deflationary bias
increase. We find that the perception of the target level of the output gap is the highest in Italy.
The differences among other countries are driven by the different relative weights attached to out-
put and inflation. The perception of the weight on the output gap in the loss function is highest in
Germany and Austria, and is the lowest in Spain. Finally, our results allow us to indirectly observe
the perceived inflation target in these countries, where most of them range between 2 and 3 percent
in the medium term. This alludes that after 20 years the ECB still faces challenges in convincing
households of their objectives.
Although the question in the survey that we use is specifically on confidence in central banks to
achieve its medium-run price objective, our analysis also relates to the literature on trust in central
banks more generally. The relevance of trust for economic development and particularly for central
banks has long been established, but there are only a few papers that address this topic. Ehrmann
et al. (2013) and Hayo and Neumeier (2017) investigate the determinants of trust in the ECB. The
relationship between trust and inflation expectations has attracted attention only very recently.
Ehrmann et al. (2013) rightly noted that, “If low public trust in central banks is associated with
higher household inflation expectations, then swings in public trust in the ECB also directly affect
its ability to deliver on its mandate, although the empirical relevance of this proposition has yet to
be tested.
Bursian and Faia (2018) explore the interaction between trust and macroeconomic outcomes by
endogenizing the level of trust within a DSGE model. They test the validity of their model in a vector
autoregression setting using aggregate data and conclude that trust affects inflation expectations.
Christelis et al. (2016) use one wave from the Dutch CentERpanel to examine the effect of trust
on inflation expectations and show that trust increases inflation expectations on average. Mellina
and Schmidt (2018) study the interplay between trust in the ECB, public knowledge about the
ECB’s objectives, and inflation expectations using the German data. More generally, several papers
indirectly study trust in central banks in terms of anchored expectations. If economic agents trust
central banks, their inflation expectations should be anchored and not deviate from the announced
target or to transitory inflation shocks. See, for instance, Dra¨ger and Lamla (2018).
Our paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the model and discusses the analytical
results. Section 3 details the empirical strategy and hypotheses and section 4 describes the data.
Results are presented in section 5, while section 6 contains several robustness checks. Section 7
concludes.
2. Stylized model
This section presents the stylized model and the policy problem of the central bank. After defining
the equilibrium, we present some analytical results that serve as a basis for the hypotheses that we
outline in the next section.
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2.1. Private Sector
The private sector of the economy has the standard New Keynesian structure formulated, as pre-
sented in detail in Woodford (2003) and Gal´ı (2008). A representative, infinitely-living household
supplies labor in a perfectly competitive labor market and consumes a basket of differentiated goods
produced by firms. Firms maximize profits subject to nominal friction, as in Calvo (1983). To de-
rive closed-form results, we put all model equations except the ZLB constraint in semi-loglinear
form. In the case where the central bank has no incentives to deviate from the zero output gap
objective, our specification is similar to Nakata and Schmidt (2018). The equilibrium conditions of
the private sector are represented by the New Keynesian Phillips curve eq. (1) and the consumption
Euler equation eq. (2):
pit = κyt + βEtpit+1, (1)
and
yt = Etyt+1 − σ(it − Etpit+1 − r
∗) + τt, (2)
where pit is the inflation rate in t, yt denotes the output gap, and it is the level of the nominal
interest rate. τt is an exogenous shock that is detailed in the following text. The natural real rate
of interest, rt, equals r
∗+ 1
σ
τt. σ > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption,
β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, and the deterministic steady state of the natural real
rate, r∗, is 1
β
− 1. The slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve, κ, equals:
κ =
(1− α)(1− αβ)
α(1 + ηθ)
(σ−1 + η), (3)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is the share of firms in a given period that cannot re-optimize their price, θ > 1
denotes the price elasticity of demand for differentiated goods, and η > 0 is the inverse Frisch
elasticity of labor supply.
In principle, any demand shock, like τt, or any supply shock that would push the equilibrium to
the ZLB would be sufficient for our results to survive.4 Thus, the agents in the economy can have
potentially different perceptions of which shock causes the central bank to be pushed to the ZLB.
One alternative formulation of the shock that delivers the existence of deflationary bias, is the trust
shock that materializes when there is a lack of trust between monetary authority and economic
agents.5,6
4In the remainder of the paper, we focus on a demand shock. The equilibrium in the case of supply shock is
available upon request.
5Note that it is important to clarify the difference between credibility, reputation, confidence, and trust in the
context of this discussion. See appendix A for exact definitions.
6Trust between households and the central bank can be introduced in the model following Bursian and Faia (2018).
In their model trust emerges endogenously as an equilibrium of a strategic interaction game featuring moral hazard
and uncertainty on policy actions. In this game, households are betrayal averse, and policy makers have incentives to
deviate. We can implement a simplified version of this mechanism via an exogenous demand shock, where the main
channel through which trust affects macroeconomic dynamics is preserved. We refer to the appendix where we derive
the full version of the model with endogenous trust, but our results are not dependent on the exact definition of the
shock.
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We implement the demand shock, τt, as a two-state Markov process. These processes are
commonly used in the effective lower bound literature—for example, Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003) and Nakata and Schmidt (2018)—to intuitively describe the underlying mechanisms and
transmission processes of the shocks. We assume that τt takes the value of either τH or τL where,
for simplicity, we refer to τH > −σr
∗ as the high state and τL < −σr∗ as the low state. The
transition probabilities are given by
Prob(τt+1 = τL|τt = τH) = pH , (4)
and
Prob(τt+1 = τL|τt = τL) = pL. (5)
pH represents the likelihood of switching to the low state in the next period when the economy is
in a current high state and will be referred to as the frequency of the low state. pL denotes the
likelihood of staying in the low state when the economy is in a current low state and will be referred
to as the persistence of the low state.
2.2. Society’s Objective and the Central Bank’s Problem
Society’s welfare at time t is represented by the expected discounted sum of future utility flows,
Vt = u(pit, yt) + βEtVt+1, (6)
where society’s contemporaneous utility function, u(pit, yt), is given by the standard quadratic func-
tion of inflation and the output gap augmented for the possibility that the central bank may be
inclined to push the output gap below the natural level,
u(pi, y) = −
1
2
(pi2 + λ¯(y)2). (7)
As shown by Woodford (2003), this objective function can be derived using a second-order ap-
proximation to the household’s preferences. In this case we can further set the λ¯ to be equal to
κ
θ
.
The form of the central bank’s objective function is similar to society’s but potentially has
important differences—as advocated by the time inconsistency and rules versus discretion debates
initiated by Barro and Gordon (1983a, 1983b) and Kydland and Prescott (1977). In this paper, we
focus on two potential departures,
V CBt = u
CB(pit, yt) + βEtV
CB
t+1 , (8)
where the central bank’s contemporaneous utility, uCB(pit, yt), is of the following form:
uCB(pi, y) = −
1
2
(pi2 + λ(y − y∗)2) (9)
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Although the central bank’s objective function resembles the private sector’s function, there are
potentially two differences. First, y∗ ≥ 0 represents the central bank’s desired level of the output
gap, which, if positive, can lead to inflation bias, as proven in proposition 2.7 Second, the relative
weight that the central bank assigns to the stabilization of the output gap, λ > 0, may potentially
differ from λ¯. Also, the central bank is subject to the ZLB constraint,8
it ≥ 0. (10)
We assume that the central bank behaves discretionary and the commitment option is not
available. The central bank chooses the output gap, inflation rate, and the nominal interest rate in
each period t to maximize its objective function, subject to the behavioral constraints of the private
sector, while considering the policy functions at time t+ 1 taken as a given. Therefore, the central
bank is maximizing the following objective:
V CBt (dt) = max
pit,yt,it
uCB(pit, yt) + βEtV
CB
t+1 (dt+1). (11)
subject to the ZLB constrain in eq. (10) and the private-sector equilibrium conditions detailed in
eqs. (1) and (2).
We define the Markov perfect equilibrium as a set of time-invariant value and policy functions
{V CBt (·), y(·), pi(·), i(·)} that solves the central bank’s problem described in the preceding text, to-
gether with society’s value function V (·) that is consistent with y(·) and pi(·). Armenter (2017),
Nakata (2018), and Nakata and Schmidt (2018) point out that there are potentially four Markov
perfect equilibria in this economy. The equilibrium that is the most relevant to our current study
is the standard Markov perfect equilibrium. The standard Markov perfect equilibrium fluctuates
around a positive nominal interest rate and zero inflation and output. The other potentially in-
teresting equilibrium is the deflationary Markov perfect equilibrium that fluctuates around a zero
nominal interest rate and negative inflation and output.
The standard Markov perfect equilibrium is given by a vector yH , piH , iH , yL, piL, iL that solves
the following system of linear equations:
yH = [(1− pH)yH + pHyL] + σ [(1− pH)piH + pHpiL − iH + r
∗] + τH , (12)
piH = κyH + β [(1− pH)piH + pHpiL] , (13)
0 = λ(yH − y
∗) + κpiH , (14)
yL = [(1− pL)yH + pLyL] + σ [(1− pL)piH + pLpiL − iL + r
∗] + τL, (15)
piL = κyL + β [(1− pL)piH + pLpiL] , (16)
7There are alternatives, and possibly empirically more plausible formulations of inflation bias that build on asym-
metric preferences of the central bank or recession aversion. See, for example, Gerlach (2003), Cukierman and Gerlach
(2003), and Ruge-Murcia (2003).
8For simplicity we consider a ZLB instead of an effective lower bound that is lower than zero. Results in this paper
remain unchanged if we would consider a lower bound it < 0.
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and
iL = 0, (17)
and satisfies the non-negativity of the nominal interest rate in the high state and non-positivity of
the Lagrange multiplier on the ZLB constraint in the low state:
iH > 0, (18)
and
λyL + κpiL < 0, (19)
xk denotes the value of variable x in the k state where k ∈ {H,L}.
Proposition 1. The standard Markov perfect equilibrium exists if and only if
pL ≤ p
∗
L(Θ(−pL))
and
pH ≤ p
∗
H(Θ(−pH))
where i) for any parameter x, Θ(−x) denotes the set of parameter values excluding x, and ii) the
cutoff values p∗L(Θ(−pL)) and p
∗
H(Θ(−pH)) are given in appendix B.1.
Proof. See appendix B.1.
The two conditions guarantee the non-positivity of the Lagrange multiplier in the low state and
the non-negativity of the nominal interest rate in the high state. When the frequency of the low
state, pH , is high, the central bank reduces the nominal interest rate aggressively to mitigate the
deflationary bias. Thus, for the policy rate to be positive in the high state, pH must be sufficiently
low. With pL > p
∗
L(Θ(−pL)), inflation and output in the low state are positive when they satisfy the
consumption Euler equation and the Phillips curve: When the persistence of the low state, pL, is
high, inflation and output in a current low state are largely dependent on private-sector expectations
of output and inflation in the next period’s low state. Thus, positive inflation and output in the low
state can be self fulfilling. However, such positive inflation and output cannot be an equilibrium
because the central bank would have incentives to raise the nominal interest rate from zero in the
low state. This incentive manifests itself in the positive Lagrange multiplier in the low state when
inflation and output are positive.
The other three possible Markov perfect equilibria in this framework are: the deflationary
Markov perfect equilibrium, which is briefly discussed in the preceding text; the ZLB-free Markov
perfect equilibrium, where the ZLB constraint does not bind in either state, and the topsy-turvy
Markov perfect equilibrium, where the ZLB binds in the high state but not in the low state. The
latter two equilibria are less likely to occur. For the purpose of this paper, we do not consider
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these three equilibria. We focus on the standard Markov perfect equilibrium, as this one seems
more relevant for the set of countries that we consider in the empirical part of this paper. All these
economies have positive long-run inflation expectations and most surveys indicate that economic
agents expect the central bank to eventually raise interest rates. Furthermore, all countries have
lowered the interest rate after the end of 2015, which marks the end of the time sample for our
empirical analysis. Mertens and Williams (2018) also find empirical support in the United States
for this type of equilibrium over the deflationary (liquidity trap) equilibrium.
2.3. Analytical results
When the conditions for the existence of the equilibrium hold, it is possible to show that depending
on the values of y∗, we can observe either inflation or deflationary bias. Conditional on y∗, the signs
of the endogenous variables can be determined.
Proposition 2. When the conditions for the existence of the equilibrium hold, we can observe either
inflation or deflationary bias depending on the values of y∗.
(a) For any λ ≥ 0 and y∗ ≥ 0:9
• piH ≤ 0 iff y
∗ ≤ y˜∗ and piH > 0 otherwise, where y˜∗ ≡ −βpHrL(κC)−1
• piL ≤ 0 iff y
∗ ≤ ŷ∗ and piL > 0 otherwise, where ŷ∗ ≡ BrL(Dκλ)−1
• yH > 0
• yL ≤ 0 iff y
∗ ≤ y∗ and yL > 0 otherwise, where y∗ ≡ (1 − βpL)κ2 + (1 − β)(1 + βpH −
βpL)λ(−λ [(1− β)C + (1− βpL)]κ)
−1rL
(b) For any λ ≥ 0 and y∗ = 0: piH ≤ 0, yH > 0, iH < rH , piL < 0, and yL < 0.
(c) With λ = 0: piH = 0.
Proof. See appendix B.2.
In this proposition we can observe the interaction between the shock and the perceived target
for the output gap, y∗. As long as y∗ < min{ŷ∗, y∗}, we observe that output and inflation are below
target values in the low state, as the ZLB constraint is binding and monetary policy cannot offset
the shock. However, higher y∗ reduces these effects, and if y∗ ≥ ŷ∗, inflation becomes positive. In
the high state, firms lower prices because of a positive probability of τL (low state) that leads to a
reduction in the expected marginal costs of production. This raises the expected real interest rate
that incentivizes households to postpone their consumption plans. These anticipation effects are
mitigated by the central banks’ lowering of nominal rates. In the literature, this effect is usually
referred to as deflationary bias and alone causes inflation in the high state to be negative. With
y∗ > 0 we have an additional effect that, in equilibrium, raises inflation and leads to inflation bias
if y∗ ≥ y˜∗. As the central bank would like to stabilize the output around y∗, this raises inflation
9We use the following definitions in this proposition: B = κ2+λ(1−β(1− pH)), C =
(1−pL)
σκ
(1−βpL+βpH)− pL,
and D = −1− C.
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because of a tradeoff between inflation and output gap stabilization. Output in the high state is
positive, irrespective of the value of y∗. To be precise, both effects of y∗ and rL lead to higher
output (see propositions 4 and 5). These mechanisms are consistent with those described in the
inflation bias and deflationary bias literature. As described in the last part of proposition 2, when
setting λ = 0 or in other words appointing a conservative central banker (Rogoff, 1985) there are
no inflation or deflationary biases.
We now further establish several results on how the degree of conservatism affects endogenous
variables in both states.
Proposition 3. How the degree of conservatism affects endogenous variables depends on the values
of y∗. Higher conservatism (lower λ) reduces the absolute distance of inflation from 0 irrespective
of y∗.
(a) For any λ ≥ 0 and y∗ ≤ y˜∗: ∂piH
∂λ
≤ 0, ∂piL
∂λ
≤ 0, ∂yL
∂λ
≤ 0, and ∂yH
∂λ
< 0.
(b) For any λ ≥ 0 and y∗ > y˜∗: ∂piH
∂λ
> 0, ∂piL
∂λ
> 0, ∂yL
∂λ
> 0, and ∂yH
∂λ
> 0.
Proof. See appendix B.3.
This proposition states that, as the central bank cares relatively more about inflation, both
inflation and deflationary biases that can occur in the high state will be lower, and inflation will
move closer to zero in the high state. When deflationary bias prevails (y∗ ≤ y˜∗) and inflation in
the high state is negative, then a lower value of λ increases inflation. However, when inflation bias
prevails (y∗ ≥ y˜∗) and inflation in the high state is positive, then a lower value of λ decreases
inflation in this state.
Proposition 4 details the effect of the y∗ on expectations:
Proposition 4. For any y∗ ≥ 0: ∂piH
∂y∗
> 0, ∂piL
∂y∗
> 0, ∂yH
∂y∗
> 0, and ∂yL
∂y∗
> 0.
Proof. See appendix B.4.
Higher y∗ increases expectations of inflation in both states. This is a standard result in the
inflation bias literature. Note that, in the case where deflationary bias is present, an increase in
y∗ means that the deflationary bias is reduced or even that expectations are now in the region of
inflation bias.
Proposition 5. For any τL:
∂piH
∂τL
> 0, ∂piL
∂τL
> 0, ∂yH
∂τL
< 0, and ∂yL
∂τL
> 0.
Proof. See appendix B.5.
The effects of the size of the shock, τL, on expectations is described in proposition 5. The
increase in τL would increase inflation expectations in both states, while it would decrease output
in the high state and increase the output in the low state.
Next, we turn out attention to pH . In the next proposition, we focus on the effect on piH , which
is the main object of the empirical part of our study.
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Proposition 6. For any pH that satisfies conditions for existence of equilibrium
∂piH
∂pH
< 0 and for
any pL that satisfies the existence conditions
∂piH
∂pL
< 0.
Proof. See appendix B.6
As we can see in proposition 6, the effect of pH on inflation expectations is always negative.
Thus, when there is a higher probability of the shock, which would push the economy to the ZLB,
the inflation expectations are lower and the deflationary bias is higher.
We show that the effects of pL and pH on piH are very similar, as the effect of pL is negative
for piH . A higher value of pL will increase deflationary bias (or decrease inflation bias) in both the
high and low state. As discussed in the preceding text, even in the high state, firms are aware that
there is a possibility of having a bad shock and falling into a low state. When firms know that
the low state will last even longer, they are likely to further lower prices, given the expected fall
in marginal costs of production will persist for a longer duration. The central bank will then have
to mitigate the anticipation effects by further lowering the nominal interest rate. This would lead
to more deflationary bias. In the low state, an increase in the persistence will require a stronger
response from the central bank to stabilize the economy. We would expect lower nominal interest
rates and would expect inflation to fall in the low state. Thus, increasing the persistence of the low
state would lead to further deflationary bias.
Corollary 1 summarizes the results for pH :
Corollary 1. We can observe the following effects on piH depending on the level of y
∗:
(a) For any y∗ ≤ y˜∗: piH ≤ 0 and ∂piH∂pH < 0 and
∂piH
∂pL
< 0 and ∂piH
∂λ
≤ 0 and ∂piH
∂y∗
> 0.
(b) For any y∗ > y˜∗: piH > 0 and ∂piH∂pH < 0 and
∂piH
∂pL
< 0 and ∂piH
∂λ
> 0 and ∂piH
∂y∗
> 0.
Proof. See proofs of the propositions in the preceding text.
This corollary states that there are two regions of y∗. In the first region, when y∗ ≤ y˜∗, piH is
nonpositive. Collorary 1 shows that this will also be coupled with a negative effect of pH . Thus,
in this case, we have a deflationary bias and higher pH that further increases the deflationary bias.
For this case, we also have that higher conservatism and higher y∗ decreases the inflation bias, as
formulated in propositions 3 and 4. When y∗ is larger than y˜∗, we have the case where inflation
bias exists and a higher pH and higher degree of conservatism decrease the amount of inflation bias,
while higher y∗ increases the inflation bias.
3. Hypotheses and Empirical Strategy
This section details the hypotheses that will be tested using survey data and explains the empirical
strategy. The first hypothesis states that both inflation and deflationary biases can occur when
economic agents assign either a positive probability of hitting the ZLB constraint (deflationary bias)
or when they perceive y∗ to be positive (inflation bias). As monetary authorities in all countries in
the sample decreased the interest rates after the end of the sample, we consider that our sample is
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best described by a standard Markov perfect equilibrium in a high state, given that, in the low state,
the equilibrium features interest rates at the effective lower bound. We assume that households that
take part in this survey use the above model to forecast inflation and that they know the correct
structural parameters, but they form their own perceptions of the four non-structural parameters
that influence inflation expectations and could lead to lower confidence in the central bank achieving
its inflation target. The four non-structural parameters are the (perceived) probability of entering
the low steady state (pH), the probability of staying in the low steady state (pL), the degree of
conservatism (λ), and the output gap target level (y∗). This will guarantee that the heterogeneity
of their responses can be explained using differences in perceptions of these parameters.
The survey asks “How confident, if at all, are you that the central bank is currently pursuing
the correct policies in order to meet its target of price stability (that is, inflation around [target])
over the medium term (that is, the next 3 - 5 years)?” We assume that there are two possibilities,
within the model, that lead the economic agents to reply that they are not confident that the central
bank is pursuing the right policies to meet its inflation target. The first possibility is due to the
perception of y∗ being positive. In cases where economic agents believe that y∗ > 0, they would
expect higher than target inflation, which actually leads to higher inflation. Thus, the central bank
would not be pursuing the right policies to achieve the inflation objective. The second possibility
is when the agents perceive a positive probability of the shock, (pH), that could push the economy
to the ZLB. As we saw in the theoretical model, this leads to inflation expectations that are lower
than the inflation target, which causes the actual inflation to be below the target.10 Once again, in
this case, the central bank is not pursuing the right policies to meet its inflation objective—inflation
is too low—and thus they should answer that they are not confident that the central bank will
achieve its inflation objective.11 The exact size of these effects will depend on the perceptions of
λ. For simplicity of the analysis in the empirical part of this paper, we will assume that pL and
pH are fixed and known and that all consumers will have the correct perceptions of the probability
and average duration at the ZLB, as it is not possible to distinguish the effects between all non-
structural parameters. Thus, we will explain the heterogeneity of inflation expectations with λ
and y∗. This choice is supported by the fact that we control for the macroeconomic conditions in
respective countries, which at least partially controls for pL and pH .
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Hypothesis 1. Depending on y∗, for λ, pH > 0 there exists either deflationary or inflation bias, as
described in proposition 2.
Testing this hypothesis entails examining whether households with low confidence have inflation
expectations either lower or higher than their inflation objective, depending on their perceptions of
10In practice and in the model that we outlined, it could also be the combination of both factors. In this case the
resulting inflation expectations will exhibit the net effect.
11There were several proposals in the literature and policy circles on how to alleviate this concern. Among others,
one proposal suggested that (temporary) price level targeting could alleviate these concerns. In fact, a simple way to
achieve the target would be to set λ = 0. See Nakata and Schmidt (2018).
12Note that in a more realistic model, pH would depend on the distance of interest rate from the ZLB (see Nakata,
2017), so it is reasonable to expect that this probability is state(time)-dependent, although our model assumes that
it is a constant.
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y∗. As the structural parameters have differential effects on piH , we can furthermore test the effects
of y∗ and λ.
The Hypotheses 2 and 3 test the difference of inflation expectations within the monetary union,
and study the differential effects of λ and y∗. Households within the European Monetary Union
have been experiencing common monetary policy since the establishment of the ECB in 1999. There
are two potential sources of the difference in inflation expectations within a monetary union: λ and
y∗. The model suggests a clear distinction between these two effects, as they imply a differential
effect on deflationary bias when the level of confidence decreases.
Hypothesis 2. Within a monetary union, differences in inflation expectations, could be explained by
the perception of y∗. Within a monetary union, the perception of λ is the same across all countries.
A cross-country comparison of inflation expectations, given the level of confidence, implies that
an increase in λ reduces both inflation and deflation bias, while an increase in y∗ reduces deflationary
bias and increases the inflation bias. Therefore, when a country is compared to a reference country,
a country with lower inflation bias does not necessarily also have lower deflation bias.
Hypothesis 3. Level of confidence varies across EMU countries: Countries with higher confidence
have lower variance of inflation expectations.
Testing this hypothesis involves testing whether unconditional variance of inflation expectations
(disagreement of inflation expectations around the target level) is lower in countries, where the level
of confidence is higher (lower pH). This examines the relevance of inflation and deflationary bias
for the distribution of inflation expectations.
4. Data
Our main dataset consists of individual level data across nine countries from 11 survey waves from
the end of 2013 to the end of 2015 with a total of 84,735 observations.13 To analyze the data, we
combine countries and survey waves to form a panel of data across individuals, countries, and time.
The microdata we use in this paper is collected by YouGov, an online research center focusing on
the perceptions and opinions of individuals across the world.14
The survey has information on inflation expectations, confidence in central bank, trust in the
government, and general characteristics of the individual. To measure inflation expectations, the
13More specifically, our country sample includes individuals living in Austria, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy,
Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Surveys have been conducted beginning of each quarter.
14YouGov conducts surveys using Active Sampling: It predetermines who is allowed to participate in the survey in
order to maximize the representativeness of the sample. Each survey is anonymous and takes under 10 minutes to
complete and YouGov provides a monetary incentive for completing the survey. After surveys are conducted, the data
is statistically weighted to correspond to the national population profile of all adults over the age of 18. These weights
are calculated based on Census data, large-scale random probability surveys, election results, and national statistic
agencies. YouGov, specifically, weights based on age, gender, social class, region, party identity, and the readership
of individual newspapers. YouGov’s results have been shown to be comparable in accuracy to other major polling
entities and have a high predictive accuracy for actual outcomes in national and regional elections. YouGov operates
in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. They use a partner to conduct surveys in Austria, Hong Kong, Italy,
Singapore, Spain, and Switzerland. YouGov’s public opinion research is conducted according to the Market Research
Society guidelines.
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survey asks the participants to provide their short-run inflation expectations,(what they expect
inflation to be 12 months from the date of the survey) and their medium-run inflation expectations,
(what they expect inflation to be five years from the date of the survey). To measure central bank
confidence, the survey asks the following question: “How confident, if at all, are you that the central
bank is currently pursuing the correct policies in order to meet its target of price stability (i.e.,
inflation around [target]) over the medium term (i.e., the next 3 - 5 years)?” The individual then
chooses between “Not at all,”“Not very,”“Fairly confident,” or “Very confident.” To measure trust
in the government, the survey asks the individual the following question: “To what extent do you
agree or disagree with the following statement? ‘I think that the government is currently following
the right economic policies for [Country]’.” The participants then choose between the following
answers: “Strongly disagree,” “Tend to Disagree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Tend to Agree,”
and “Strongly agree.” General characteristics that YouGov surveys include general characteristics,
including the participants gender, age, and region in which they are currently living.15
The macroeconomic variables we use are annualized CPI inflation rate, short-run interest rate,
real GDP growth, and the unemployment rate. We collect these variables from the ECB for all
European Union (EU) countries and from the central bank websites for all countries outside of the
European Union except Singapore, whose data come from the Singapore Government Department
of Statistics. We classify a country as inflation targeting based on the central bank mission, as
stated on the country’s central bank website. Those countries who state a specific number as their
inflation target are labeled as inflation targeting in our sample.16
4.1. Summary Statistics
In the following text, we introduce our confidence measure and provide first evidence on the link
between confidence and inflation expectation.
Roughly 60 percent of the survey population is not confident with respect to the central bank in
their country meeting the inflation close to their target level.17 This is not unexpected, as this period
is dominated by very low inflation rates in Europe. Furthermore, the values are comparable to the
EU Eurobarometer survey. The Eurobarometer survey asks “For each of the following institutions,
please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it or don’t know?”. During that period
roughly 30 percent of the respondents trusted the ECB which is very close to the average of 28
percent we report. Interestingly, we can observe that we have some country heterogeneity. While
in most of the EMU countries, the majority is not confident, in countries like United Kingdom and
Switzerland, the majority is confident that the central bank will meet their objective.
For both short- and medium-run inflation expectations, the means differ across the range of
confidence in the central bank. Using a t-test to compare the mean inflation rate and a Kruskal-
Wallis equality of populations rank test to compare the median inflation rate across confidence level,
15With respect to the ordering of the questionnaire, the survey starts with the questions on inflation expectations,
followed by the question on the confidence in the central bank and the question on the government’s economic policy.
16We also classify the ECB as an inflation targeting central bank.
17See Table A.2 for details. It contains the shares of consumers that are confident for overall and specific charac-
teristics (age, gender, etc.), countries and over time.
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we find that, for each confidence level, the mean and median inflation expectation in both short-
and medium-run are statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level when compared
to the remaining levels of confidence.18 We furthermore observe that individuals that are not
confident have, on average, a 1 percent higher short-run inflation expectation and almost a 1.5
percent higher medium-run inflation expectation. From these observations, so far, we can only infer
that the majority tend to have higher inflation expectations when confidence is lost. However, our
model predicts that losing confidence, under certain assumptions, may also lead to lower inflation
expectations.
To gain some insight into this potential pattern, we present two graphs. First, we look at the
share of “not confident” individuals across the spectrum of inflation expectations, and second, we
compare how the distribution of inflation expectations changes depending on whether people are
confident or not.
For the first approach, we calculate the share of people that are confident for intervals of inflation
expectations. If we plot the share of confidence across different bins of inflation expectations and
there is no deflation bias, we should expect a rising share of people being not confident with rising
inflation expectations. However, if a deflation bias exists, we should expect a u-shape relationship.
Close to the target inflation rate, the confident shares should be very high. If we move away from
this area there should be fewer people who are confident. Most people who have no confidence could
expect either very high inflation or very low inflation. Figure 1 shows the resulting distribution for
the share of people who are not confident across different levels of inflation expectations for short-
and medium-run inflation expectations. We can clearly observe the u-shaped pattern. Most people
that are confident have inflation expectations around 1.0 percent to 2.0 percent. Hence losing
confidence leads to having high expectations >2.5 percent or very low expectations <0 percent
which clearly indicates the potential of generating both inflation as well as deflation bias.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of expectations of confident and not confident individuals for
short- and medium-run expectations. Not-confident individuals are presented in pink columns. We
can observe that losing confidence moves the distribution substantially to the right and causes
the well-documented inflation bias. However, on closer inspection, we can observe that there is a
movement to lower inflation expectations as well. This movement is clearly visible for medium-run
inflation expectations at the bracket 0-1 percent.
In both graphs we observe that there is a substantial inflation bias of “not-confident” individuals
as there is a higher amount of people with higher expectations. However, of particular interest and
in line with our model predictions, we also observe an increasing amount of individuals who have
lower inflation expectations as a response to losing confidence and hence have a deflationary bias.
This deflationary bias is particularly strong for medium-term inflation expectations.
18In Table A.1, we compare the means for short-run inflation expectations and medium-run inflation expectations
by the range of confidence in the central bank and compare these means across political orientation, inflation targeting
countries, trust in government, countries, gender, age, and survey wave.
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Figure 1. Confidence Level Shares By Distance from Inflation Target For Not Confident Sample
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Figure 2. Distribution of Short- and Medium-run Inflation Expectations of Confident and Non-
Confident Individuals
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Notes: The black outlined clear bars show the distribution of confident individuals’ inflation expectations, while the
pink bars show the distribution of expectations of not-confident individuals.
5. Results
In this section we use econometric means to test our hypotheses derived from our theoretical model.
As already indicated in the previous section there seems to be support for the conjecture that lack
of confidence is linked to both, an inflation as well as a deflationary bias.
To test hypotheses 1 and 2 we use the following equation and adjust the set of explanatory variables
as necessary:
piei,j,t = α+ βNCi,j,t + δxpi
e,x
i,j,t +Φxpi
e,x
i,j,tNCi,j,t + ΓZi,j,t + µj + νt + εi,j,t;x ∈ H,L;
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where the subscripts i, j, t denote individual i, country j, and time t. pie represents medium-term
expectations (3-5 years ahead) or short-term expectations (1-year ahead) in some of the robustness
checks. NC (not confident) captures whether the individual is confident in the central bank achieving
inflation close to 2 percent. pie,Hi,j,t and pi
e,L
i,j,t represent the above and below thresholds that are
explained in the following text. The vector Z contains several control variables including individual
characteristics as well as macroeconomic control variables. µ and ν are region and year fixed effects
and ε is the i.i.d error term. For the errors we use two-way clustering in region and time.
We control for socioeconomic characteristics, such as gender and age; the macroeconomic situa-
tion in the country proxied by the short-term interest rate; economic growth; and the inflation rate.
Literature on survey inflation expectations commonly identifies the bias in inflation expectations.
Sociodemographic characteristics and macroeconomic conditions explain part of this bias (see, for
example Ehrmann et al., 2017 or Souleles, 2004). Finally, we control for trust in the government.
As there might be a lack of trust in institutions in general, we need to make sure that we only
identify the lack of confidence in central banks and do not confuse it with attitudes toward other
policy making bodies.
As one-year-ahead expectations may be strongly influenced by transitory shocks, we opt to
focus on medium-run expectations that are not prone to such short-term movements and may
reflect longer-run effects such as changes in policy strategy or objectives. Results for short-run
expectations are presented in the robustness section.
In table 1, we test hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 is tested by adding the not-confident indicator
dummy and by interacting this indicator with thresholds for inflation expectations below 1.5 percent
and above 2.5 percent. Therefore, we consider expectations between 1.5 percent and 2.5 percent,
which are centered around the official target for inflation targeting central banks, to be the reference
level region to which we will compare expectations in the other two regions. In effect, we calculate
the average effects of not confident in three regions of inflation expectations. Notably this is an
ad-hoc threshold indicating a moderate deviation of expectations from the inflation target. We
report a number of robustness checks and alternative definitions of these thresholds, among others,
we re-estimate the same equation with thresholds of 1 percent and 3 percent and where we calculate
the country-specific thresholds that may not be necessarily centered around the official target.19 As
our model predicts the possibility of both inflation and deflationary biases, we expect the above
interaction term to be positive (adding to the inflation bias) and the below interaction term to
be negative (adding to the deflationary bias). This hypothesis would be rejected if the below
interaction term is positive or insignificant indicating that a loss in confidence results in an inflation
bias independent the probability of the low state. In such a case, this result would confirm the
standard inflation bias prediction. Notably, being able to identify and quantify the inflation bias
as such would still be a substantial contribution. Similarly, if the above interaction term is not
significant or negative this outcome would imply a rejection of the hypothesis about inflation bias.
In column (1) of table 1, we include, aside from the control variables and the time and region
fixed effects, the main variable of interest, but we do not include the interaction terms for different
19Results are reported in the robustness section in table 4.
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Table 1: Medium-Run Expectations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Not Confident 1.107*** 1.102*** -0.401*** -0.526***
(0.0519) (0.0518) (0.0345) (0.135)
Gov. Mistrust 0.231*** 0.274*** 0.157*** 0.156***
(0.0534) (0.0538) (0.0484) (0.0485)
Inflation Target -1.781*** -0.425** 0.152
(0.192) (0.193) (0.197)
Below -1.357*** -1.175***
(0.0270) (0.0667)
Below nc -0.120*** -0.122***
(0.0352) (0.0351)
Above 3.456*** 4.119***
(0.0847) (0.0866)
Above nc 1.500*** 1.533***
(0.0764) (0.0782)
Nc it 0.131
(0.142)
Below it -0.202***
(0.0688)
Above it -0.744***
(0.105)
Observations 46,785 46,785 46,785 46,785
R-squared 0.073 0.074 0.278 0.278
MacroVar Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socio Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Two-way (region time) clustered standard errors in parentheses. “Above”
represents dummy variable denoting a threshold of 2.5 percent and “Below” a
threshold of 1.5 percent respectively. Medium-run expectations are 3-5 years
ahead. All regressions include regional and year fixed effects. Errors are
two-way clustered over time and region. “Below nc” and “Above nc” repre-
sent interaction terms between “Not Confident” and the “Above” or “Below”
threshold. “Nc it”denotes the interaction term between“Inflation Target”and
“Not Confident”. “Above it” and “Below it” are the interaction terms between
“Inflation Targeting” and the “Above” and “Below” threshold variables. “FE”
denotes fixed effects. “Socio” stands for control variables on socioeconomic
characteristics and “MacroVar” for macroeconomic control variables.
*** p<0.01
** p<0.05
* p<0.1
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regions of distribution. As such, these results represent the average results for the whole distribution
of inflation expectations. We can show that the coefficient estimate of being not confident in the
central bank is statistically highly significant and has a positive sign. Losing confidence in a central
bank on average generates the classical result of an inflation bias. Notably, we not only provide
empirical evidence of this result, but are now in a position to exactly quantify inflation bias as
resulting in a 1.1 percent higher medium-run inflation expectations. Given that inflation targets
are around 2 percent in our country sample this number reflects a substantial bias. However, our
analysis below confirms that there is a significant heterogeneity in inflation expectations and that
not all households exhibit inflation bias.
In column (2) we add a dummy variable for inflation-targeting countries. Our main variable of
interest remains highly significant. Looking at the relevance of inflation targeting, the corresponding
coefficient estimate is negative implying that inflation targeting reduces medium-run expectations
by 1.8 percent. Hence, we can re-confirm the effect of inflation targeting of reducing inflation
expectations and bringing them closer to the target level.
In column (3) we dig deeper and test hypothesis 1 that is, the simultaneous existence of an
inflation and deflationary bias. Therefore, as described above, we add the dummy variables “Above”
and “Below” and the corresponding interaction terms of above and below with being not confident
(denoted as Above nc and Below nc). Those interaction terms are of particular interest here.
The first important observation regarding this estimation setup is the sharp increase in the
explanatory power of the specification. While in the previous columns the R2 was approximately
0.07, when we account for deflationary and inflation bias, the R2 increases to 0.33. Hence, accounting
for this non-linearity improves the quality of this estimation substantially.
Looking at the estimation results (for 1.5 percent and 2.5 percent as thresholds), we observe
that the coefficient estimates of above nc and below nc are statistically significant and have opposite
signs. The estimate for above nc is positive, implying that having inflation expectations above 2.5
percent and being not confident leads to an inflation bias for medium-term expectations of 1.5-
0.4=1.1 percent. To the contrary, the coefficient estimate of below nc is negative implying that
individuals having inflation expectations below 1.5 percent, losing confidence leads to even lower
inflation expectations and a deflationary bias (for medium-term expectations: -0.12-0.40=-0.52
percent). With these results, we can provide first-time evidence of the simultaneous existence of
inflation and deflationary bias and quantify it.
In column (4), we explore how controlling for inflation targeting affects the results for inflation
and deflationary biases. For this purpose we interact inflation targeting with our threshold variables.
As inflation targeting should reduce the variability of inflation expectations, we expect that the
interaction term with “Above” should be negative and the interaction term with “Below” should be
positive.
We can observe that there is little change in the coefficient estimates of our main variables of
interest. This estimation leads to very similar results for both inflation and deflationary biases: 1
percent and 2/3 percent, respectively. We observe that inflation targeting shifts the whole distribu-
tion of inflation expectations to the left, as both coefficient estimates of “Above it” and “Below it”
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Table 2: EMU Medium-Run Expectations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EMU Germany Austria France Spain Italy
Not Confident -0.150*** -0.266*** -0.0245 0.0115 -0.0397 -0.0891
(0.0355) (0.0615) (0.0768) (0.0626) (0.0812) (0.0823)
Gov. Mistrust -0.0156 -0.286*** 0.0229 -0.0268 0.0459 0.129**
(0.0297) (0.0616) (0.103) (0.0529) (0.0544) (0.0598)
Below -1.285*** -0.940*** -1.149*** -1.062*** -1.204*** -1.264***
(0.0313) (0.0510) (0.129) (0.0538) (0.0668) (0.0519)
Below nc -0.232*** -0.334*** -0.607*** -0.384*** -0.192** 0.00548
(0.0397) (0.0760) (0.190) (0.0723) (0.0839) (0.0746)
Above 4.202*** 3.356*** 3.396*** 4.805*** 5.413*** 4.367***
(0.104) (0.160) (0.228) (0.284) (0.218) (0.189)
Above nc 0.919*** 1.078*** 0.916*** 0.804** -0.360 1.577***
(0.113) (0.187) (0.247) (0.315) (0.259) (0.228)
Observations 26,194 6,534 2,820 4,208 6,205 6,427
R-squared 0.292 0.238 0.235 0.349 0.332 0.308
Macro Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socio Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Two-way (region-time) clustered standard errors are in parentheses. “Above”represents a dummy variable
denoting a threshold of 2.5 percent and “Below” a threshold of 1.5 percent respectively. Medium-run
expectations are 3-5 years ahead. All regressions include region and time fixed effects. “Below nc” and
“Above nc” represent interaction terms between “Not Confident” and the “Above” or “Below” threshold.
“FE” denotes fixed effects. “Socio” stands for control variables on socioeconomic characteristics and
“MacroVar” for macroeconomic control variables.
*** p<0.01
** p<0.05
* p<0.1
are negative and significant. Especially, the coefficient on the interaction with above is quite large.
This means that the dispersion of inflation expectations is lower in the inflation targeting countries.
Here we have to note that our sample has only two central banks that are not pursuing inflation
targeting, so these results may be affected by the selection of countries in our sample.
Hypothesis 2 is tested running the same regression for hypothesis 1 column (3) but for the EMU
countries only. Furthermore, to explore the different perception of y∗, we estimate the specification
of each country separately. With that setup, we can analyze country specific inflation and deflation
bias effects of losing confident.
Table 2 contains the estimation results. In the first column we replicate the specification of
Table 1 column (3) for the EMU countries in our sample. The other columns replicate the same
specification for the individual member country.
Column (1), which replicates previous results for the EMU sub-sample, confirms the simul-
taneous existence of inflation and deflationary biases for the EMU countries. The coefficients of
above nc and below nc are positive and negative respectively and confirm together with the ”‘not
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confident”’ coefficient estimate the existence of inflation and deflationary biases (-0.15+0.92=0.77
and -0.14-0.23=-0.37). These estimates are a touch smaller than for our full sample of countries. In
columns (2)-(6), we replicate the same specification for each EMU member state individually. We
observe that Germany, France, and Austria have inflation bias as well as deflationary bias. Spain
only has a deflationary bias, while Italy only has an inflation bias. In terms of size, Italy has the
strongest response of losing confidence in the price stability objective resulting in a high inflation
bias followed by Germany, Austria, and France. Regarding the deflationary bias Germany and Aus-
tria have the highest coefficient estimate, followed by France and Spain. Overall, it is remarkable
how different the responses to losing confidence in terms of size and propensity for inflation and
deflationary biases are across the member countries of the monetary union, despite having the same
experience with the ECB. That said, our model allows us to identify the drivers of this observed
heterogeneity.
From our model, given the form of the objective function in eq. (9), the differences in the
perceptions can be either due to λ or y∗. Our theoretical framework allows us to compare country
pairs and determine if the differences in the perceptions are due to λ or y∗, as the two have different
effects on inflation and deflationary biases. Most strikingly, we can say that perceptions of y∗ in Italy
are significantly higher than in any other EMU country in the sample. Thus, in Italy, deflationary
bias is not present, while there is a high inflation bias due to perceptions that the ECB is targeting a
positive output gap. Differences in perceptions among other countries are mostly guided by different
perceptions of the weight that is associated to the output gap in the ECB’s objective function (λ).
The perceptions of λ are highest in Austria and Germany, followed by France, and the lowest in
Spain, where inflation bias is not significant. Thus, we can argue that, in Austria and Germany,
households are worried most about the ECB not pursuing a clear hierarchical mandate, where
inflation objective is the primary goal.
There is one additional possibility regarding differences in the perceptions of the ECB’s objective
function that is not explicitly modeled in eq. (9): differences with respect to the perceptions of the
inflation target. Although the ECB has clearly stated that the objective is to keep inflation “close,
but below 2 percent inflation”, Paloviita et al. (2017) has shown that in practice, this means the
inflation is around 1.7 percent. To see how different the perception is across the member states in
our sample, we use the following approach to investigate whether the perceived inflation target is
within the 1.5 percent and 2.5 percent range that we specify: We use our main regression, as in table
2, with one small adjustment that introduces an additional dummy variable for expectations above
5 percent to investigate which range for inflation target maximizes the fit of the model. We run a
grid search with a constant one-percentage-point spread between the lower bound and the upper
bound that maximizes the overall fit of the model, for each country separately. We find that for
the medium-run expectations the best fit for all countries is roughly a range between 2 percent and
3 percent (see figure A.1). Thus, it is considerably above the ECB’s inflation objective, although
the absolute differences in fit are particularly small for Spain and France, while they are larger in
particular for Austria and Germany. This has a clear implication regarding anchoring of inflation
expectations, suggesting that ECB still faces a challenge convincing households of the medium-run
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Table 3: Confidence and Dispersion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Short-Run Medium-Run Short-Run Medium-Run Short-Run Medium-Run
IQR IQR Region Region
Not Confident 2.931*** 2.746*** 0.663* 1.939*** 2.095*** 1.828***
(0.648) (0.658) (0.364) (0.559) (0.441) (0.421)
Constant 2.443*** 3.391*** 1.440*** 2.289*** 2.839*** 3.685***
(0.442) (0.457) (0.248) (0.351) (0.286) (0.276)
Observations 97 97 97 97 1,025 1,021
R-squared 0.189 0.201 0.033 0.114 0.027 0.022
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is the variance of inflation expectations within
a country per time. “Not confident” is the share of population within a country that indicated being not confident.
*** p<0.01
** p<0.05
* p<0.1
inflation objective.20 These results thus complement results in the previous paragraph, where we
observed that the perception in Germany and Austria are in line with the ECB not putting enough
weight on inflation developments (relative to output gap) in its utility function. In Germany and
Austria it is believed that the inflation target that ECB is pursuing is slightly larger, both in the
short-run and in the medium-run, compared to the publicly stated objective.
Hypothesis 3 can be tested by comparing the variance and dispersion of inflation expectations
against the share of people that are confident across countries and time. Our model predicts that
with more people being not confident, inflation and deflationary biases are increasing, implying a
positive correlation. Table 3 shows a simple bi-variate ordinary least squares regression between the
variance of short- and medium-run inflation expectations (across countries and time) against the
share of people being not confident. We provide evidence of that for both horizons of expectations
of a higher share of the not confident population increases the dispersion of beliefs. Again the
medium-run effect is stronger and exerts a higher level of statistical significance. This result is
robust to using alternative robust measures of dispersion such as the interquartile range (that is,
the difference between the 25th and 75th quartiles), as we can see in columns (3) and (4). We
further check the validity of these conclusions by computing the variance by region instead of by
country. These results are reported in columns (5) and (6) and confirm our baseline estimation
results using country-level variance.
6. Robustness
In this section we conduct several types of robustness checks to solidify our results. Specifically, we
check the robustness of the specification in table 1 column (3). Table 4 contains all the different
20The more striking difference among countries actually emerges if we repeat the same exercise using short-run
expectations. In that case, the fit for Spain, Italy, and France is maximized for the 1.5 percent to 2.5 percent range–in
line with ECB’s objective. While for Germany and Austria, it is maximized in the 2 percent to 3 percent range,
similar to the medium-run expectations.
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robustness exercises we executed. For ease of reading, column (1) of table 4 is our benchmark
estimation result of column (3) of table 1.
6.1. Short-run Effects
Our main results focus on medium-run expectations. Nevertheless, it is interesting to check what
the short-run (one-year ahead) effect of losing confidence is and whether we can already observe
the same asymmetry in the short-run. One would expect that, in the short run, the deflationary
and inflation biases are smaller. Column (2) of table 4 contains the estimation results for this time
horizon. Overall, we observe qualitatively identical results. We provide evidence for inflation and
deflationary biases. In terms of size, the effects are lower than in the medium run, as we would have
expected. Losing confidence increases one year ahead expectations by approximately 0.65 percent
compared to 1.1 percent for the medium run. This is not unexpected as one year ahead is a shorter
horizon were the effect of losing confidence should not fully materialize.
6.2. Government Trust
One could argue that consumers may state that they are not confident in the central bank—not
necessarily because of inflation alone but because of a general lack of trust of government policy.
Usually this is hard to tackle, as one must compare the opinion toward other government bodies
or entities with the opinion regarding the central bank. To account for this possibility we decided
to exclude all respondents that distrust the government. With this, we exclude everybody that
distrusts the government and also has no confidence in the central bank, thereby we account for a
potential general negative attitude toward public bodies. Estimation results are presented in column
(3) of table 4. Again, our results hold, and we confirm, even in this substantially reduced sample,
the inflation and deflationary biases. While the inflation bias is about 0.8 percent, the deflationary
bias is about 0.4 percent.
6.3. Higher Order Fixed Effects
While we include a set of variables to control for macroeconomic events one might argue that
we might miss some relevant variation in the data. To control for that we estimate region times
time fixed effects accounting for any variation at one quarter within one region (most countries in
the sample are comprised of several regions) that could drive our results. Estimation results are
presented in column (4) of table 4 and again are qualitatively identical.
6.4. Bootstrap Standard Errors
Our standard errors are clustered at time times regional level and therefore account for joint variation
of regions at one point in time. But of course, one could argue that we are not accounting for the
possibility that the errors follow a different pattern. To capture this concern we decided to bootstrap
our error at this level of our clustered standard errors. Results are presented in column (5) of table
4. Again our main results remain unaffected.
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Table 4: Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Main Short-Run Gov. Trust Higher Order FE Bootstrap Heckman 1%-3% Country Specific Full Measure
Not Confident -0.401∗∗∗ -0.230∗∗∗ -0.328∗∗∗ -0.411∗∗∗ -0.401∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.354∗∗∗ -0.334∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
Gov. Mistrust 0.157∗∗ -0.077 0.149∗∗ 0.157∗∗ -0.014 0.134∗∗ 0.111∗ 0.078
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Inflation Target -0.425∗ -0.136 -0.216 0.470 -0.425 -0.108 -0.182 -0.310 -0.442∗
(0.19) (0.19) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.07) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Below -1.357∗∗∗ -0.834∗∗∗ -1.362∗∗∗ -1.372∗∗∗ -1.357∗∗∗ -2.775∗∗∗ -1.615∗∗∗ -1.035∗∗∗ -1.413∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.14) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Below nc -0.120∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗ -0.055 -0.115∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -1.543∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.285∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.20) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01)
Above 3.456∗∗∗ 1.895∗∗∗ 3.516∗∗∗ 3.462∗∗∗ 3.456∗∗∗ 1.169∗∗∗ 3.962∗∗∗ 3.466∗∗∗ 4.146∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.02) (0.10) (0.09) (0.06)
Above nc 1.500∗∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗ 1.116∗∗∗ 1.483∗∗∗ 1.500∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 1.379∗∗∗ 1.427∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.02) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03)
Not ConfidentF -0.146∗∗∗
(0.01)
R-squared 0.278 0.164 0.276 0.292 0.278 0.308 0.300 0.279
Observations 46785 50074 25764 46747 46785 73355 46785 46785 46785
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macrovar Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socio Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region×Time FE Yes
If not otherwise specified in the column: Two-way (region time) clustered standard errors in parentheses. “Above” represents dummy variable denoting a threshold of
2.5 percent and“Below”a threshold of 1.5 percent in all columns but column (8) respectively. See footnote 20 for country-specific thresholds. Medium-run expectations
are 3-5 years ahead. All regressions include region and time fixed effects. “Below nc” and “Above nc” represent interaction terms between “Not Confident” and the
“Above” or “Below” threshold. “FE” denotes fixed effects. “Socio” stands for control variables on socioeconomic characteristics and “MacroVar” for macroeconomic
control variables. “Not ConfidentF” refers to the measuring confidence on a scale between -2 to 2 while “Not Confident” is a 0/1 variable.
*** p<0.01
** p<0.05
* p<0.1
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6.5. Heckman Selection Bias
Another issue to check is a potential selection bias. To account for that we use a Heckman selection
approach. In the selection equation we use the same set of variables plus two additional variables
one capturing the fear of inflation and the second inferring expected income change. Results are
presented in column (6) of table 4. Again our results remain qualitatively identical. Results suggest
that the size of the inflation and deflationary biases may be partially influenced by the selection
bias, as the size of deflationary bias increases and the size of inflation bias decreases. This may
be because responders who are more likely to report inflation bias more often do not answer the
questions regarding long-run expectations.
6.6. Alternative Threshold of 1 Percent to 3 Percent
As already mentioned in the main text the threshold we chose was ad hoc, and results might hinge
upon that. To counter this argument, we re-estimated the main table for an alternative threshold
of 1 percent to 3 percent. Results are presented in column (7) of table 4. Comparing this table to
the main table we can observe that we have qualitative identical results as well as quantitatively
very similar results. The overall bias is 1.107 in Table 1 and has exactly the same value in column
(7) of table 4. The above nc and below nc coefficients are both slightly smaller. Hence, changing
the threshold does not affect our results.
An additional check for the thresholds is to utilize another question in the survey that asks to the
tendency to agree with the following statement: “Rising inflation is giving me and my family cause
for concern at the moment.” As for the not confident questions, the answers range from strongly
agree to strongly disagree. Table 5 shows the categories of being concerned about rising inflation
against the corresponding average short and medium run inflation expectations in this category.
As can be seen, the average responses of those who agree and disagree are broadly in line with the
thresholds that we considered that is, 1.5 percent and 2.5 percent.
Table 5: Inflation Concern and Short
and Medium-Run Inflation Expecta-
tions
Concern pies pi
e
m
Strongly disagree 1 2
Tend to disagree 1.5 2.4
Neither agree nor disagree 2 3
Tend to agree 2.5 3.5
Strongly agree 3 4
πes denotes averaged short-run expectations
while πem represents averaged medium-run
expectations in the corresponding ‘concern’
category.
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6.7. Alternative Country-Specific Thresholds
To provide yet another robustness test on the thresholds, we compute country-specific thresholds.
Our goal is to find a county-specific thresholds, where the reference group will have no inflation
and no deflation biases. As you can see in column (2) of table 6, there is a deflationary bias in
the reference group, as the coefficient on not confident is significantly negative. That means that
at least in some countries the reference group thresholds are potentially too low. To study this
we implement a country-specific regressions with a fixed reference group width (difference between
above and below). We find that at least for Singapore and Honk Kong the reference group is
potentially set too low.21 Results are presented in column (8) of table 4. Comparing this table to
the main table, we can observe that we have qualitative identical results. As one would expect,
by more correctly identifying the region where deflation bias, the estimate of inflation bias slightly
increases, by about 0.1 percent, while the estimate of inflation bias is virtually unchanged.
6.8. Full Measure of Confidence
For ease of exposition we decided to work with a 0/1 measure of confidence. Our survey, however,
captures confidence in an ordinal scale. To see whether this simplification might affect our results
we re-estimate the main table with this full (ordinal) measure. Results are reported in column (9)
of table 4. Again, the results remain qualitatively identical. Given that this variable is not 0 and 1
but ranges between -2 and 2, we cannot directly compare the coefficient estimates.
6.9. Inflation Targeting and Inflation/Deflation Bias
In this section we test the implications of central bank design on inflation expectations. One reason
for the introduction of inflation targeting was to control inflation also via the inflation expectations.
Our sample consists of both inflation and non-inflation targeting countries, although only two out
of nine countries are not inflation targeting countries. We have already shown that the dispersion
of inflation expectations is lower in inflation targeting countries than in other countries in our
sample. Here we also test implications to the inflation and deflationary biases in these two groups
of countries.
We test the difference in sizes of these biases by implementing a triple interaction term between
above (below), non-confident and inflation targeting. As inflation targeting, according to our model,
should reduce both biases, we expect a negative coefficient for the above interaction and a positive
coefficient for the below interaction term.
Table 6 presents the results. Column (1) provides the estimation of our main table for com-
parison. In column (2) we observe that the results for our standard thresholds are the same in all
countries. These results suggest that there is no statistical difference in inflation and deflationary
biases among inflation and non-inflation targeting central banks, although we confirm the results
21In specific, we set the reference group width to 3-4 percent for Hong Kong; 2-3 percent for Singapore; 1-2 percent
for Switzerland; 2-3 percent for Germany, UK, and Italy; and 1.5-2.5 percent for the remaining countries.
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Table 6: Inflation Targeting and Confidence
(1) (2) (3)
Country Specific
Gov. Mistrust 0.231*** 0.156*** 0.111**
(0.0534) (0.0485) (0.0473)
Not Confident 1.107*** -0.389*** -0.377***
(0.0519) (0.0707) (0.0914)
Above 4.188*** 3.983***
(0.110) (0.128)
Not Confident×above 1.374*** 1.266***
(0.160) (0.162)
Inflation Target 0.213 0.0551
(0.192) (0.189)
Not Confident×Inflation Target -0.0153 0.0522
(0.0777) (0.0965)
above×Inflation Target -0.822*** -0.611***
(0.144) (0.161)
Not Confident×above×Inflation Target 0.175 0.220
(0.181) (0.184)
Below -1.224*** -1.165***
(0.0752) (0.0695)
Not Confident×below -0.0309 0.0529
(0.143) (0.0893)
Below×Inflation Target -0.152* 0.149**
(0.0795) (0.0737)
Not Confident×below×Inflation Target -0.0923 -0.375***
(0.147) (0.0947)
Observations 46,785 46,785 46,785
R-squared 0.073 0.278 0.300
MacroVar Yes Yes Yes
Socio Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses. “Above” represents dummy variable denoting a threshold of
2.5 percent and “Below” a threshold of 1.5 percent respectively for columns (1) and (3). See footnote
20 for country-specific thresholds. Medium-run expectations are 3-5 years ahead. All regressions
include region and time fixed effects. “FE” denotes fixed effects. “Socio” stands for control variables
on socioeconomic characteristics and “MacroVar” for macroeconomic control variables.
*** p<0.01
** p<0.05
* p<0.1
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from Table 1 that the dispersion of inflation expectations is smaller in inflation targeting countries
in our sample.
However, in column (3) of table 6 we perform an additional check—that is also potentially an
interesting robustness check for our results overall—where we assign a country-specific threshold for
the reference group, as in section 6.7. After adjusting the reference group in column (3) of table 6, we
do not find a significant difference in the inflation bias among these two groups of countries (about
1.25 percent), however the deflationary bias is twice as large among inflation targeting countries,
0.75 percent, compared to other countries in our sample.
Overall, while we find evidence that inflation targeting reduces inflation bias, we provide evidence
that it increases deflationary bias. Notably, we face the same empirical limitations other studies
have in analyzing the implications of inflation targeting. We have only a few countries that are not
inflation targeting countries in our sample and consequently they might not be seen as an optimal
comparison group.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate implications of losing confidence in the price objective of the central
bank for households’ inflation expectations. We first build a model with an occasionally binding
zero-lower-bound constraint and a central bank’s loss function that is potentially different from the
optimal one. We show that in this environment inflation expectations can either have inflation or
deflationary bias. Second, we test several hypotheses derived from the model using individual-level
data on inflation expectations and confidence in a central bank’s ability to achieve the specified
inflation objective for nine countries. This novel survey design allows us to directly test for inflation
and deflationary biases.
Our results suggest that both inflation and deflationary biases are present in the survey data.
They are also sizable: Losing confidence implies an inflation bias of about 1 percentage point and a
deflationary bias of -2/3 percentage point for the medium-run inflation expectations. Inflation and
deflationary biases are somewhat smaller for the short-run inflation expectations, but still significant
and relevant for policy makers. This result shows that communication strategies (management of
expectations) are critical for central banks to achieve the inflation objective. For our sample of
countries, we also find that countries who pursue inflation targeting have lower inflation expectations
and lower dispersion of inflation expectations as well. However, no support is found that inflation
and deflationary biases are mitigated: Our results indicate that in our sample the deflationary bias
may even become larger under an inflation targeting regime.
Furthermore, our model allows us to identify the average differences in the perceptions of Euro-
pean Central Bank’s objective function across euro-area countries in our sample. This is particularly
interesting as the EMU countries share the exact same experience in terms of the ECB’s monetary
policy. The empirical results show quite remarkable differences: Germany, Austria, and France
have both inflation and deflationary biases, Spain has a deflationary bias only, and Italy has only an
inflation bias. Our model allows us to dissect these differences and interpret them as either a result
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of different perceptions of the target level of the output gap or different relative weights attached to
output and inflation in the perception of the ECB’s loss function. We can show that the perception
of the target level of the output gap is the highest in Italy among these countries. The differences
among other countries are mostly driven by the different relative weights attached to output and
inflation. These results indicate that the ECB faces an ongoing challenge in convincing households
of their objectives.
Overall, our results highlight the importance of communication and the relevance of a sound
central bank reputation, particularly when the economy is operating close to the zero lower bound
and using nonstandard monetary policy tools.
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Appendix A. Model with Endogenous Trust
When discussing inflation or deflationary bias often several descriptions of the relationship be-
tween the central bank and economic agents are put forward. Note that it is important to clarify
the difference between credibility, reputation, confidence, and trust in the context of this discussion.
While all these concepts are inherently related, the game theoretic literature distinguishes between
them. To clarify the objective of the question asked in the survey, it relates to the public confidence
that the central bank is currently pursuing appropriate policies to achieve price stability over the
medium term. The main difference among credibility (reputation), trust, and confidence is that
credibility (reputation) consists of the characteristics of the institution or individual (one-sided),
while trust and confidence are inherently two-sided relationships, as they are characterized by the
preferences of both agents involved in this game (relationship).22 In economic terms, trust can be
defined as “the belief or perception by one party (for example, a principal) that the other party (for
example, an agent) to a particular transaction will not cheat” (Knack, 2001). It is more difficult
to disentangle the difference between trust and confidence as they are strongly related. Potentially,
trust could be a broader concept than confidence, as one could argue that confidence is based on
trust, or that it is a perception of trust. In a game theoretic setup, a trust game embeds moral haz-
ard due to uncertainty of which action will be implemented, while a reputation game is characterized
by asymmetric information on the type of agent.
A.1. The Marginal Utility with Respect to Consumption
UA (Ct, τt, φt) = α˜1 (τt, φt)− α˜2 (τt) e−δCt
where α˜1 (τt, φt) = α1 + α2τt − α3 (φt) τ2t
and α˜2 (τt) = α1 + α2τt
So UA (Ct, τt, φt) becomes
UA (Ct, τt, φt) = α1 + α2τt − α3 (φt) τ2t − (α1 + α2τt) e−δCt
where τt = ψ1,t
(
1− e−δCt
)
+ ετt
Taking the derivative of the utility function with respect to consumption we have:
22Credibility and reputation depend solely on the actions and characteristics of the institution or individual. Repu-
tation involves learning based on past experience; in other words, repeated credible actions and achieved targets lead
to a certain reputation and uncertainty regarding the type of agents slowly dissipates. Generally, trust in institutions
and policy making is a wider concept than reputation, as it is the nexus of both preferences of the trustee and the
trustor (see, Bursian and Faia, 2018).
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UA
∂Ct
= α2
τt
∂Ct
− 2α3 (φt) τt τt
∂Ct
+ α1δe
−δCt + α2
(
−τtδe−δCt + e−δCt τt
∂Ct
)
where
τt
∂Ct
= δψ1,te
−δCt
Plugging in for
τt
∂Ct
:
UA
∂Ct
= α2ψ1,tδe
−δCt − 2α3 (φt)ψ21,tδe−δCt + 2α3 (φt)ψ21,tδe−2δCt − 2α3 (φt)ψ1,tετt δe−δCt
+ α1δe
−δCt − α2ψ1,tδe−δCt + α2δe−2δCt − α2ετt δe−δCt + α2ψ1,tδe−2δCt
Which simplifies to:
UAC,t = [−2α3 (φt)ψ1,t − α2] ετtt δe−δCt +
[
α1 − 2α3 (φt)ψ21,t
]
δe−δCt
+ [2α3 (φt)ψ1,t + α2]ψ1,tδe
−2δCt + α2δe
−2δCt
The steady state for the marginal utility with respect to consumption is:
UAC = [−2α3 (φ)ψ1 − α2] ετ δe−δC +
[
α1 − 2α3 (φ)ψ21
]
δe−δC
+ [2α3 (φ)ψ1 + α2]ψ1δe
−2δC + α2δe
−2δC
A.2. The Log-Linearized Marginal Utility with Respect to Consumption
UAC
ˆUA
C,t
=
[
−2α3(φ)ετ δe−δC − 4α3(φ)ψ1δe−δC + 4α3(φ)ψ1δe−2δC + α2δe−2δC
]
ψ ˆψ1,t
+ [− (−2α3(φ)ψ1 − α2) ετ δ2e−δC −
(
α1 − 2α3(φ)ψ21
)
δ2e−δC
− 2 (2α3(φ)ψ1 + α2)ψ1δ2e−2δC − 2α2δ2e−2δC ]CCˆt
+ [(−2α3(φ)ψ1 − α2) δe−δC ]ετ εˆτt
Cleaning up the log-linearization:
UAC
ˆUA
C,t
= [−2α3(φ)ετψ1δe−δC + α2ετ δe−δC − α2ετ δe−δC + α1δe−δC − α1δe−δC
− 2α3(φ)ψ21δe−δC − 2α3(φ)ψ21δe−δC + 2α3(φ)ψ21δe−2δC + 2α3(φ)ψ21δe−2δC
+ α2δe
−2δC − α2δe−2δC + α2ψ1δe−2δC ] ˆψ1,t
− δ[(−2α3(φ)ψ1 − α2) ετ δe−δC +
(
α1 − 2α3(φ)ψ21
)
δe−δC + (2α3(φ)ψ1 + α2)ψ1δ
2e−2δC
+ (2α3(φ)ψ1 + α2)ψ1δ
2e−2δC + α2δ
2e−2δC + α2δ
2e−2δC ]CCˆt
+ [(−2α3(φ)ψ1 − α2) δe−δC ]ετ εˆτt
33
Using the definition of the steady state of marginal utility with respect to consumption:
ˆUA
C,t
=
[
UAC − δ
[(
α2ε
τ + α1 + 2α3(φ)ψ21
)
δe−δC + (α2 − 2α3(φ)ψ1) e−2δC
]
UA
C
]
ˆψ1,t
− δC
[
UAC + δ [(2α3(φ)ψ1 + α2)ψ1 + 2α2] e
−2δC
UA
C
]
Cˆt
−
[
[2α3(φ)ψ1 + α2] ετ δe−δC
UA
C
]
εˆτt
ˆUA
C,t
=
[
1− δ
[(
α2ε
τ + α1 + 2α3(φ)ψ21
)
δe−δC + (α2 − 2α3(φ)ψ1) e−2δC
]
UA
C
]
ˆψ1,t
− δC
[
1 +
δ [(2α3(φ)ψ1 + α2)ψ1 + 2α2] e−2δC
UA
C
]
Cˆt
−
[
[2α3(φ)ψ1 + α2] ετ δe−δC
UA
C
]
εˆτt
A.3. Log-Linearizing the Euler Equation
UAC,t = βEtU
A
C,t+1
1 + it
pit+1
When we log-linearize we get:
UAC
ˆUA
C,t
=
βUAC
pi
iiˆt +
βUAC (1 + i)
pi2
pi ˆpit+1 +
β(1 + i)
pi
UAC
ˆUA
C,t+1
This simplifies to:
ˆUA
C,t
=
βi
pi
iˆt +
β(1 + i)
pi
ˆpit+1 +
β(1 + i)
pi
ˆUA
C,t+1
Appendix B. Proof of Propositions
B.1. Proof of Proposition 1
The standard Markov perfect equilibrium is given by a vector yH , piH , iH , yL, piL, iL that solves the following system of
linear equations:
yH = [(1− pH)yH + pHyL] + σ [(1− pH)piH + pHpiL − iH + r∗] + τH , (20)
piH = κyH + β [(1− pH)piH + pHpiL] , (21)
0 = λ(yH − y∗) + κpiH , (22)
yL = [(1− pL)yH + pLyL] + σ [(1− pL)piH + pLpiL − iL + r∗] + τL, (23)
piL = κyL + β [(1− pL)piH + pLpiL] , (24)
and
iL = 0, (25)
and satisfies the non-negativity of the nominal interest rate in the high state
iH > 0, (26)
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φL denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the ZLB constraint in the low state:
φL := λyL + κpiL. (27)
We will prove the four preliminary propositions (proposition 1.A-1.D), and use these propositions to prove the main propo-
sition (proposition 1) on the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the standard Markov perfect equilibrium.
Let
A(λ) := −βλpH , (28)
B(λ) := κ2 + λ(1− β(1− pH)), (29)
C :=
(1− pL)
σκ
(1− βpL + βpH)− pL, (30)
D := − (1− pL)
σκ
(1− βpL + βpH)− (1− pL) = −1− C, (31)
and
E(λ) := A(λ)D −B(λ)C. (32)
Assumption 1.A: E(λ) 6= 0.
Throughout the rest of this proof, we will assume that Assumption 1.A holds.
Proposition 1.A: There exists a vector yH , piH , iH , yL, piL, iL that solves (20)-(25).
We can rearrange the system of equations (20)-(25) and eliminate yH and yL.
Using (22) we have:
yH = y
∗ − κ
λ
piH
We substitute this value for yH into equation (21):
piH = κyH + β[(1− pH)piH + pHpiL]
= κ[y∗ − κ
λ
piH ] + β[(1− pH)piH + pHpiL]
βpHpiL + κy
∗ = piH +
κ2
λ
piH − β(1− pH)piH
if we multiply this expression by λ:
[κ2 + λ(1− β(1− pH))]piH − βλpHpiL = κλy∗ (33)
When we solve for yH in equation 21 and yL in equation 24 we have:
yH =
1
κ
piH −
1
κ
β[(1− pH)piH + pHpiL] (34)
yL =
1
κ
piL −
1
κ
β[(1− pL)piH + pLpiL] (35)
We substitute these values for yH and yL into equation 23:
(1− pL)
[
1
κ
piL −
1
κ
β[(1− pL)piH + pLpiL]
]
= (1− pL)
[
1
κ
piH −
1
κ
β[(1− pH)piH + pHpiL]
]
+ σ[(1− pL)piH + pLpiL + r∗] + τL
[
(1− pL)
κ
(1− βpL + βpH)− σpL
]
piL −
[
(1− pL)
κ
(1 + βpH − βpL) + σ(1− pL)
]
piH = σr
∗ + τL (36)
35
Therefore we have two unknowns, piH and piL, and two equations:
[
A(λ) B(λ)
C D
][
piL
piH
]
=
[
κλy∗
rL
]
⇒
[
piL
piH
]
=
1
A(λ)D −B(λ)C
[
D −B(λ)
−C A(λ)
][
κλy∗
rL
]
(37)
where rL = r
∗ + 1
σ
τL.
Therefore, we have:
piH =
A(λ)
E(λ)
rL −
C
E(λ)
κλy∗ (38)
and
piL =
−B(λ)
E(λ)
rL +
D
E(λ)
κλy∗ (39)
This gives us the following Phillips curves in both states:
yH = y
∗ − κ
λ
piH
yH = y
∗ − κ
λ
[
A(λ)
E(λ)
rL −
C
E(λ)
κλy∗
]
yH =
βκpH
E(λ)
rL +
(
1 +
C
E(λ)
κ2
)
y∗ (40)
yL =
1
κ
[piL − β [(1− pL)piH + pLpiL]]
yL = −
(1− βpL)κ2 + (1− β)(1 + βpH − βpL)λ
κE(λ)
rL − λ [(1− β)C + (1− βpL)]
y∗
E(λ)
(41)
Proposition 1.B: Suppose (20)-(25) are satisfied. Then φL < 0 if and only if E(λ) < 0
Proof: Notice that
φL = λyL + κpiL
= λ
[
− (1− βpL)κ
2 + (1− β)(1 + βpH − βpL)λ
κE(λ)
rL
]
− λ [(1− β)C + (1− βpL)]
λy∗
E(λ)
+ κ
[−B(λ)
E(λ)
rL +
D
E(λ)
κλy∗
]
Group terms:
φL = −
[
λ
κ
[
(1− βpL)κ2 + (1− β)(1 + βpH − βpL)λ
]
+ κB(λ)
]
rL
E(λ)
+
[
κ2D − λ [(1− β)C + (1− βpL)]
] λy∗
E(λ)
Now simplify the y∗ term:
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=
[
κ2D − λ [(1− β)C + (1− βpL)]
] λy∗
E(λ)
=
[
− [κ2 + λ(1− β)] (1− βpL + βpH)
σκ
(1− pL)− [κ2 + λ](1− pL)
]
λy∗
E(λ)
(42)
Putting all the terms together we have:
φL = −
[
λ
κ
[
(1− βpL)κ2 + (1− β)(1 + βpH − βpL)λ
]
+ κB(λ)
]
rL
E(λ)
− (1− pL)
[[
κ2 + λ(1− β)] (1− βpL + βpH)
σκ
+ [κ2 + λ]
]
λy∗
E(λ)
(43)
Thus (1− pL)
[
(λ−λβ+κ2)
σκ
(1− βpL + βpH) + [κ2 + λ]
]
≤ 0 if pL ≤ 1.
We have that τL < 0, (1− βpL)κ2 > 0, (1− β)(1 + βpH − βpL)λ ≥ 0, and κB(λ) ≥ 0. Also, if E(λ) < 0, then φL < 0.
However, if y∗ > 0, given that:
−
[
λ
κ
[
(1− βpL)κ2 + (1− β)(1 + βpH − βpL)λ
]
+ κB(λ)
]
rL > (pL − 1)
[
(λ− λβ + κ2)
σκ
(1− βpL + βpH) + (κ2 + λ)
]
λy∗
then we come to the same conclusion as above that if φL < 0, then E(λ) < 0 and also if E(λ) < 0, then φL < 0.
Proposition 1.C: E(λ) < 0 if and only if p∗L < (Θ−pL )
Proof: Let E(·) be a function of pH and pL for this purpose.
E(pH , pL) =A(pH , pL)D −B(pH , pL)C (44)
=− βpHλ(−1− C)−
[
κ2 + λ (1− β(1− pH))
]
C
=βpHλ−
[
κ2 + λ (1− β)] [ (1− pL)
σκ
(1− βpL + βpH)− pL
]
(45)
Let Γ = κ2 + λ (1− β).
E(pH , pL) =
=βpHλ− Γ
[
(1− pL)
σκ
(1− βpL + βpH)− pL
]
=− Γβ 1
σκ
p2L + Γ
[
1
σκ
(1 + β + βpH) + 1
]
pL + βλpH − Γ
1
σκ
(1 + βpH)
:=q2p
2
L + q1pL + q0 (46)
Where we have that:
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q0 :=βλpH − Γ
1
σκ
(1 + βpH) (47)
q1 :=Γ
[
1
σκ
(1 + β + βpH) + 1
]
(48)
q2 :=− Γβ 1
σκ
(49)
The function, E(·, ·), has the following two properties:
Property 1: E(pH , 1) > 0 for any 0 ≤ pH ≤ 1.
E(pH , pL) =− Γβ
1
σκ
+ Γ
[
1
σκ
(1 + β + βpH) + 1
]
+ βλpH − Γ
1
σκ
(1 + βpH)
=Γ + βλpH > 0 (50)
Property 2: E(pH , pL) is maximized at pL > 1 for any 0 ≤ pH ≤ 1.
∂E(pH , pL)
∂pL
=2q2p
∗
L + q1 = 0
↔ p∗L =−
q1
2q2
=
Γ
[
1
σκ
(1 + β + βpH) + 1
]
2Γβ 1
σκ
=
[
1
σκ
(2β + (1− β) + βpH) + 1
]
2β 1
σκ
> 1 (51)
(52)
Property 1 and property 2 imply together that i) one root of E(·, pL) is below 1 and ii) E(·, pL) < 0 below this root. We
will call this root p∗L(Θ−pL )
p∗L(Θ
1
−pL
) :=
−q1 −
√
q21 − 4q2q0
2q2
. (53)
Based on the properties outlined above, if E(λ) < 0, then pL < p
∗
L(Θ−pL ). Likewise, if pL < p
∗
L(Θ−pL ), then E(λ) < 0.
This completes the proof of proposition 1.C. Proposition 1.C. holds regardless of whether the system of linear equations (20)-(25)
is satisfied or not.
Proposition 1.D: Suppose (20)-(25) are satisfied and E(λ) < 0. Then iH > 0 if and only if pH < p
∗
H(Θ−pH ).
Proof: iH comes from rearranging yH
yH = [(1− pH)yH + pHyL] + σ [(1− pH)piH + pHpiL − iH + r∗] + τH (54)
We multiply by 1
σ
:
iH =
1
σ
[(1− pH)yH + pHyL] + (1− pH)piH + pHpiL + r∗ +
1
σ
τH −
1
σ
yH
=
1
σ
[−pHyH + pHyL] + (1− pH)piH + pHpiL + rH
where rH = r
∗ + 1
σ
τH .
We have that iH is equal to the following:
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iH =
1
σ
[−pHyH + pHyL] + (1− pH)piH + pHpiL + rH
where rH = r
∗ + 1
σ
τH .
Now we plug in for yH , yL, piH , and piL:
iH =
−pH
σ
[
βκpH
E(λ)
rL +
(
1 +
C
E(λ)
κ2
)
y∗
]
+
pH
σ
[
− (1− βpL)κ
2 + (1− β)(1 + βpH − βpL)λ
κE(λ)
rL − [(1− β)C + (1− βpL)]
λy∗
E(λ)
]
+ (1− pH)
[
A(λ)
E(λ)
rL −
C
E(λ)
κλy∗
]
+ pH
[−B(λ)
E(λ)
rL +
D
E(λ)
κλy∗
]
+ rH (55)
Now we group the rL and y
∗ terms:
iH =
[
−pH
([(
1 + κ2
C
E(λ)
)
+ [(1− βpL) + (1− β)C]
λ
E(λ)
]
1
σ
− Cλκ
E(λ)
− Dλκ
E(λ)
)
− Cλκ
E(λ)
]
y∗
+
[
−pH
([
κβpH +
(1− βpL)κ2 + λ(1− β)(1− βpL + βpH)
κ
]
1
σ
+A(λ) +B(λ)
)
+A(λ)
]
rL
E(λ)
+ rH
Now we look at the y∗ term and simplify it:
First we pull out 1
E(λ)
of the expression and group with the y∗ term:
[
−pH
([(
E(λ) + κ2C
)
+ [(1− βpL) + (1− β)C]λ
] 1
σ
− Cλκ−Dλκ
)
− Cλκ
]
y∗
E(λ)
First, we will look at the term multiplied by 1
σ
:
[(
E(λ) + κ2C
)
+ [(1− βpL) + (1− β)C]λ
] 1
σ[−βλpHD − [κ2 + λ(1− β(1− pH))]C + κ2C + [(1− βpL) + (1− β)C]λ] 1
σ
[βλpH + λ(1− βpL)]
1
σ
(56)
Then we look at the term multiplied by −pH
− pH
(
[βλpH + λ(1− βpL)]
1
σ
− Cλκ−Dλκ
)
− pH
(
[βλpH + λ(1− βpL)]
1
σ
+ λκ
)
(57)
So our y∗ term is:
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[
−pH
(
[βλpH + λ(1− βpL)]
1
σ
+ λκ
)
− Cλκ
]
y∗
E(λ)[(−βλp2H − λpH + λβpLpH − (1− pL)λ(1− βpL)− (1− pL)λβpH) 1
σ
− pHλκ+ pLλκ
]
y∗
E(λ)
(58)
Now we group our y∗ term by power of pH :
[−βλ
σ
p2H +
(
1
σ
[βpLλ− λ− λ(1− pL)β]− λκ
)
pH −
λ(1− pL)(1− βpL)
σ
+ pLλκ
]
y∗
E(λ)
(59)
So our full simplified y∗ term is:
[−βλ
σ
p2H − λ
(
1 + β(1− 2pL)
σ
+ κ
)
pH − λ
(
(1− pL)(1− βpL)
σ
− pLκ
)]
y∗
E(λ)
Next, we group the terms of rL terms and simplify the expression:
[
−pH
([
κβpH +
(1− βpL)κ2 + λ(1− β)(1− βpL + βpH)
κ
]
1
σ
+A(λ) +B(λ)
)
+A(λ)
]
rL
E(λ)[
−pH
(
[κ2 + λ(1− β)][βpH + (1− βpL)]
κσ
+ κ2 + λ(1− β)]
)
− βλpH
]
rL
E(λ)
(60)
We know that Γ = κ2 + λ(1− β), so we have:
[
−pH
Γ[βpH + (1− βpL)]
κσ
− pHκ2 − pHλ+ pHλβ)− βλpH
]
rL
E(λ)[
−pH
Γ[βpH + (1− βpL)]
κσ
− pHκ2 − pHλ
]
rL
E(λ)
(61)
Now we group our rL term by the power of pH :
[−Γβ
κσ
p2H −
(
Γ(1− βpL)
κσ
+ κ2 + λ
)
pH
]
rL
E(λ)
(62)
With the simplification of the y∗ term and rL term, our full expression for iH becomes:
iH =
[−βλ
σ
p2H − λ
(
1 + β(1− 2pL)
σ
+ κ
)
pH − λ
(
(1− pL)(1− βpL)
σ
− pLκ
)]
y∗
E(λ)
+
[−Γβ
κσ
p2H −
(
Γ(1− βpL)
κσ
+ κ2 + λ
)
pH
]
rL
E(λ)
+ rH
(63)
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The final expression for iH grouped by the power of pH :
iH =
[−βλ
σ
y∗
E(λ)
− Γβ
κσ
rL
E(λ)
]
p2H
−
[
λ
(
1 + β(1− 2pL)
σ
+ κ
)
y∗
E(λ)
+
(
Γ(1− βpL)
κσ
+ κ2 + λ
)
rL
E(λ)
]
pH
− λ
(
(1− pL)(1− βpL)
σ
− pLκ
)
y∗
E(λ)
+ rH
We want to show that iH > 0 when E(λ) < 0:
We will multiply the expression by −E(λ):
[
βλ
σ
y∗ +
Γβ
κσ
rL
]
p2H +
[
λ
(
1 + β(1− 2pL)
σ
+ κ
)
y∗ +
(
Γ(1− βpL)
κσ
+ κ2 + λ
)
rL
]
pH + λ
(
(1− pL)(1− βpL)
σ
− pLκ
)
y∗ − E(λ)rH > 0[
βλ
σ
y∗ +
Γβ
κσ
rL
]
p2H +
[
λ
(
1 + β(1− 2pL)
σ
+ κ
)
y∗ +
(
Γ(1− βpL)
κσ
+ κ2 + λ
)
rL − rHβλ+ rHΓβ
1− pL
κσ
]
pH
+ λ
(
(1− pL)(1− βpL)
σ
− pLκ
)
y∗ + rHΓ
(
(1− pL)
κσ
(1− βpL)− pL
)
> 0
Now we divide by Γ and −rL:
[ −βλ
σΓrL
y∗ − β
κσ
]
p2H −

λ
(
1 + β(1− 2pL)
σ
+ κ
)
y∗
ΓrL
+
(1− βpL) + (1− pL)β
rH
rL
κσ
+
κ2 + λ(1− β rH
rL
)
Γ

 pH
− λ
ΓrL
(
(1− pL)(1− βpL)
σ
− pLκ
)
y∗ − rH
rL
(
(1− pL)
κσ
(1− βpL)− pL
)
> 0
Let
P (pH) = φ2p
2
H + φ1pH + φ0 (64)
where
φ0 := − λ
ΓrL
(
(1− pL)(1− βpL)
σ
− pLκ
)
y∗ − rH
rL
(
(1− pL)
κσ
(1− βpL)− pL
)
(65)
φ1 :=

λ
(
1 + β(1− 2pL)
σ
+ κ
)
y∗
ΓrL
+
(1− βpL) + (1− pL)β
rH
rL
κσ
+
κ2 + λ(1− β rH
rL
)
Γ

 (66)
φ2 :=
[ −βλ
σΓrL
y∗ − β
κσ
]
(67)
(68)
Property 1: φ0 > 0
iH =
[−βλ
σ
y∗
E(λ)
− Γβ
κσ
rL
E(λ)
]
p2H
−
[
λ
(
1 + β(1− 2pL)
σ
+ κ
)
y∗
E(λ)
+
(
Γ(1− βpL)
κσ
+ κ2 + λ
)
rL
E(λ)
]
pH
− λ
(
(1− pL)(1− βpL)
σ
− pLκ
)
y∗
E(λ)
+ rH
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If we have that pH = 0, then the expression reduces to:
iH = −λ
(
(1− pL)(1− βpL)
σ
− pLκ
)
y∗
E(λ)
+ rH (69)
When pH = 0 we have iH = −λ
(
(1−pL)(1−βpL)
σ
− pLκ
)
y∗
E(λ)
+ rH .
(1−pL)(1−βpL)
σ
− pLκ > 0, when pL < p∗L(Θ2−pL ) :=
βκσ+1−
√
(βκσ+1)2−4β
2β
.
This completes the proof of property 1.
Property 2: φ2 < 0
In order for φ2 < 0, we must have that:
[ −βλ
σΓrL
y∗ − β
κσ
]
< 0
−βλ
σΓrL
y∗ <
β
κσ
We will multiply by −rL since we have by assumption that rL < 0
βλ
σΓ
y∗ < −rL
β
κσ
λ
Γ
y∗ < −rL
1
κ
y∗ < −rL
Γ
κλ
y∗ < −rL
κ2 + λ(1− β)
κλ
rL < −y∗
κλ
κ2 + λ(1− β) (70)
As long as rL < −y∗ κλκ2+λ(1−β) , then φ2 < 0. This completes the proof of Property 2.
Property 1 and property 2, φ0 > 0 and φ2 < 0, imply that one root of (64) is non-negative and iH > 0 if and only if pH is
below this non-negative root, given by
p∗H(Θ−pH ) :=
−φ1 −
√
φ21 − 4φ0φ2
2φ2
. (71)
This completes the proof of proposition 1.D.
With these four preliminary propositions (1.A -1.D), we have what we need to prove proposition 1.
Proposition 1: There exists a vector {yH , piH , ßH , yL, piL, iL} that solves the system of linear equations (20)-
(25) and satisfies φL < 0 and iH > 0 if and only if pL < p
∗
L(Θ−pL ) and pH < p
∗
H(Θ−pH ), where p
∗
L(Θ−pL ) =
min{p∗L(Θ1−pL ), p∗L(Θ2−pL )}.23
Proof of “if” part: Suppose that pL < p
∗
L(Θ−pL ) and pH < p
∗
H(Θ−pH ). According to proposition 1.A there exists a vector
{yH , piH , ßH , yL, piL, iL} that solves the system of linear equations (20)-(25). According to proposition 1.B and 1.C, E(λ) < 0
and φL < 0. According to proposition 1.D and the fact that E(λ) < 0, iH > 0. This completes the “if” part of the proof.
Proof of “only if”part: Suppose that φL < 0 and iH > 0. According to proposition 1.A there exists a vector {yH , piH , ßH , yL, piL, iL}
that solves the system of linear equations (20)-(25). According to proposition 1.B and 1.C, E(λ) < 0 and pL < p
∗
L(Θ−pL ).
According to proposition 1.D and the fact that E(λ) < 0, pH < p
∗
H(Θ−pH ). This completes the “only if” part of the proof.
23It is straightforward to show that the sufficient (but not necessary) condition for Θ1−pL) < p
∗
L(Θ
2
−pL
) is that
κσ < 2/β.
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B.2. Proof of proposition 2
We characterize the sign of inflation and output depending on whether it is low or high state. We will use the restriction
regarding rL that guarantees us the existence and E(λ) < 0, the inequalities on A(λ), A(λ) < 0; B(λ), B(λ) > 0; C and D.
Namely that when E(λ) < 0, C > 0 and D < 0.
When y∗ = 0, we get, as in Nakata and Schmidt (2018), that piH ≤ 0, piL < 0, yH > 0 and yL < 0.
However, when y∗ does not equal zero, our equations are augmented.
piH =
A(λ)
E(λ)
rL −
C
E(λ)
κλy∗
Given that − C
E(λ)
κλy∗ is a positive number, it is possible under certain conditions for piH to be positive. Whenever,
y∗ >
A(λ)rL
Cκλ
then piH > 0. Under the assumption that restrictions for the existence of equilibrium are satisfied (proposition 1)
we can conclude that:
piH =


A(λ)
E(λ)
rL − CE(λ)κλy∗ ≤ 0, iff y∗ ≤ −
βpH
κC
rL
A(λ)
E(λ)
rL − CE(λ)κλy∗ > 0, iff otherwise
Note that −βpH
κC
rL =
A(λ)rL
Cκλ
.
piL =
−B(λ)
E(λ)
rL +
D
E(λ)
κλy∗
Given that D
E(λ)
κλy∗ > 0, it is possible under certain conditions for piL to be positive. Whenever y
∗ >
B(λ)rL
Dκλ
, then
piH > 0.
piL =


−B(λ)
E(λ)
rL +
D
E(λ)
κλy∗ < 0, iff y∗ <
B(λ)rL
Dκλ
−B(λ)
E(λ)
rL +
D
E(λ)
κλy∗ ≥ 0, iff otherwise
yH =
βκpH
E(λ)
rL +
(
1 +
C
E(λ)
κ2
)
y∗
yH > 0 as long as
βλpH
E(λ)
rL +
(
1 + C
E(λ)
κ2
)
y∗ > 0
We will multiply by −E(λ):
− βκpHrL +
(−E(λ)− Cκ2) y∗ > 0
− βκpHrL > λ (βpH − (1− β)C) y∗
(72)
If (βpH − (1− β)C) < 0, then we have:
−βκpH
λ (βpH − (1− β)C)
rL < y
∗
(73)
Since both the numerator and denominator are negative, and given that rL < 0,
−βκpH
λ(βpH−(1−β)C)
rL < 0. y
∗ ≥ 0, therefore,
this equality will always hold. Thus, yH > 0 when βpH − (1 − β)C < 0. Solving this inequality leads us to the condition
pL < p
∗
L(Θ
3
−pL
). Now we can straightforwardly show that p∗L(Θ
3
−pL
) > p∗L(Θ
1
−pL
) from the proposition 1 (existence of the
equilibria), and thus for all values of pL that satisfy the existence conditions we have that yH > 0.
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yL = −
(1− βpL)κ2 + (1− β)(1 + βpH − βpL)λ
κE(λ)
rL − λ [(1− β)C + (1− βpL)]
y∗
E(λ)
24By comparing p∗L(Θ
3
−pL
) and p∗L(Θ
1
−pL
), one can easily show that p∗L(Θ
3
−pL
) > p∗L(Θ
1
−pL
) as long as −κ2βpH < 0,
which is always true.
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Given that −λ [(1− β)C + (1− βpL)] y
∗
E(λ)
> 0, it is possible under certain conditions for yL to be positive. If y
∗ >
(1−βpL)κ
2+(1−β)(1+βpH−βpL)λ
−λ[(1−β)C+(1−βpL)]κ
rL, then yL is positive.
yL =

−
(1−βpL)κ
2+(1−β)(1+βpH−βpL)λ
κE(λ)
rL − λ [(1− β)C + (1− βpL)] y
∗
E(λ)
< 0, iff y∗ <
(1−βpL)κ
2+(1−β)(1+βpH−βpL)λ
−λ[(1−β)C+(1−βpL)]κ
rL
− (1−βpL)κ2+(1−β)(1+βpH−βpL)λ
κE(λ)
rL − λ [(1− β)C + (1− βpL)] y
∗
E(λ)
≥ 0, iff otherwise
B.3. Proof of Proposition 3
In this proposition we characterize how λ affects inflation and output in the low and high state. We will use the restriction
that E(λ) < 0, rL < 0 and the inequalities on A(λ), A(λ) < 0; B(λ), B(λ) > 0; C and D. Namely, when E(λ) < 0, C > 0 and
D < 0.
∂piH
∂λ
=
A′(λ)E(λ)−A(λ)E′(λ)
E(λ)2
rL −
E(λ)− λE′(λ)
E(λ)2
Cκy∗
=
A′(λ) [−A(λ)−A(λ)C −B(λ)C]−A(λ) [−A′(λ)−A′(λ)C −B′(λ)C]
E(λ)2
rL
− [−A(λ)−A(λ)C −B(λ)C]− λ [−A
′(λ)−A′(λ)C −B′(λ)C]
E(λ)2
Cκy∗
=
−βpHλ (1− β + βpH) + βpH
(
κ2 + (1− β + βpH)λ
)
E(λ)2
CrL
−
[
βλpH + βλpHC −
[
κ2 + λ (1− β(1− pH))
]
C
]− λ [βpH + βpHC − (1− β(1− pH))C]
E(λ)2
Cκy∗
=
βpHκ
2
E(λ)2
CrL +
κ2C
E(λ)2
Cκy∗ (74)
(75)
∂piL
∂λ
=
−B′(λ)E(λ) + E′(λ)B(λ)
E(λ)2
rL +
E(λ)− λE′(λ)
E(λ)2
Dκy∗
=
A′(λ)B(λ)−A(λ)B′(λ)
E(λ)2
DrL −
κ2C
E(λ)2
Dκy∗
=− βpHκ
2
E(λ)2
DrL −
κ2C
E(λ)2
Dκy∗ (76)
∂yH
∂λ
=
−E(λ)
E(λ)2
βκpHrL +
−E(λ)
E(λ)2
Cκ2y∗
=
−[βpH − (1− β)C]
E(λ)2
βκpHrL +
−[βpH − (1− β)C]
E(λ)2
Cκ2y∗
=
−[βpH − (1− β)C]
E(λ)2
[
βκpHrL + Cκ
2y∗
]
As shown in proposition 2, (βpH − (1− β)C) < 0 for any plausible value of pL that satisfy the existence of equilibria
(proposition 1) then ∂yH
∂λ
> 0 iff y∗ > −βpH
Cκ
rL and
∂yH
∂λ
≤ 0 iff y∗ ≤ −βpH
Cκ
rL.
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∂yL
∂λ
=
(1− β)(1− βpL + βpH)E(λ)−
(
(1− βpL)κ2 + (1− β)(1− βpL + βpH)λ
)
E′(λ)
κE(λ)2
rL
− E(λ)− λE
′(λ)
E(λ)2
[(1− β)C + (1− βpL)] y∗
=
[
(1− β)(1− βpL + βpH) [A(λ)D −B(λ)C]
κE(λ)2
]
rL
−
[(
(1− βpL)κ2 + (1− β)(1− βpL + βpH)λ
)
[A′(λ)D −B′(λ)C]
κE(λ)2
]
rL +
κ2C
E(λ)2
[(1− β)C + (1− βpL)] y∗
=
βκpH
E(λ)2
[(1− β)C + (1− βpL)] rL +
κ2C
E(λ)2
[(1− β)C + (1− βpL)] y∗ (77)
B.4. Proof of Proposition 4
In this proposition we characterize how y∗ affects inflation and output in the low and high state. We will use the restrictions
that E(λ) < 0, rL < 0 and the inequalities on A(λ), A(λ) < 0; B(λ), B(λ) > 0; C and D. Namely, when E(λ) < 0, C > 0 and
D < 0.
∂piH
∂y∗
=− C
E(λ)
κλ > 0
∂piL
∂y∗
=
D
E(λ)
κλ > 0
∂yH
∂y∗
=
(
1 +
C
E(λ)
κ2
)
=− E(λ)− Cκ2
=− [βλpH − (κ2 + λ[1− β])C]− Cκ2
=− βλpH + λ(1− β)C
=− λ(βpH + (1− β)C)
Since we’ve imposed in our earlier propositions that (βpH + (1− β)C) < 0, then we have that ∂yH∂y∗ > 0
∂yL
∂y∗
=
−λ[(1− β) + (1− β)pL]
E(λ)
> 0
B.5. Proof Proposition 5
In this proposition we characterize how τL affects inflation and output in the low and high state. We will use the restrictions
that E(λ) < 0, rL < 0 and the inequalities on A(λ), A(λ) < 0; B(λ), B(λ) > 0; C and D. Namely, when E(λ) < 0, C > 0 and
D < 0.
∂piH
∂τL
=− A(λ)
E(λ)
1
σ
> 0
∂piL
∂τL
=
−B(λ)
E(λ)
1
σ
> 0
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∂yH
∂τL
=
βκpH
E(λ)
1
σ
< 0
∂yL
∂y∗
=− (1− βpL)κ
2 + (1− β)(1 + β − βpL)λ
E(λ)κ
> 0
B.6. Proof Proposition 6
In this proposition we first characterize how pH affects inflation and output in the low and high state. We will use the
restriction that E(λ) < 0, rL < 0 and the inequalities on A(λ), A(λ) < 0; B(λ), B(λ) > 0; C and D. Namely, when E(λ) < 0,
C > 0 and D < 0.
E(λ) =− βλpH [−1− C]−
[
κ2 + λ(1− β(1− pH))
]
C
E(λ) =βλpH −
[
1− pL
σκ
(1− βpL + βpH)− pL
] [
κ2 + λ(1− β)]
∂E(λ)
∂pH
= βλ− 1− pL
σκ
β[κ2 + λ(1− β)] ∂C
∂pH
=
1− pL
σκ
β
∂A
∂pH
= −βλ
∂piH
∂pH
=
∂A(λ)
∂pH
E(λ)−A(λ) ∂E(λ)
∂pH
E(λ)2
rL −
∂C
∂pH
E(λ)− C ∂E(λ)
∂pH
E(λ)2
κλy∗
∂piH
∂pH
=
(
1− pL
σκ
(1− βpL)− pL
)
βλ
[
[κ2 + λ(1− β)]
E(λ)2
rL −
λκ
E(λ)2
y∗
]
(78)
If we want to examine when ∂piH
∂pH
< 0 :
∂piH
∂pH
=
(
1− pL
σκ
(1− βpL)− pL
)
βλ
[
[κ2 + λ(1− β)]
E(λ)2
rL −
λκ
E(λ)2
y∗
]
< 0 (79)
We thus need to show that
(
1−pL
σκ
(1− βpL)− pL
)
βλ
[
[κ2 + λ(1− β)]rL − λκy∗
]
< 0
We know that βλ > 0 and that
(
1−pL
σκ
(1− βpL)− pL
)
> 0, as the negative root of this equation is equivalent to p∗L(Θ
2
−pL
)
that is needed for the existence of the equilibria. Thus, our expression becomes:
(
1− pL
σκ
(1− βpL)− pL
)
βλ
[
[κ2 + λ(1− β)]rL − λκy∗
]
< 0 (80)
[
[κ2 + λ(1− β)]rL − λκy∗
]
< 0 (81)
λκy∗ > [κ2 + λ(1− β)]rL (82)
This expression will always hold since y∗ > 0 and rL < 0.
In the second part of this proposition we characterize how pL affects inflation and output in the low and high state. We
will use the restriction that E(λ) < 0, rL < 0 and the inequalities on A(λ), A(λ) < 0; B(λ), B(λ) > 0; C and D. Namely, when
E(λ) < 0, C > 0 and D < 0.
∂E(λ)
∂pL
= −( 1
σκ
(1 + β(1− 2pL + pH)) + 1)[κ2 + λ(1− β)]
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∂C
∂pL
= −( 1
σκ
(1 + β(1− 2pL + pH)) + 1)
∂A
∂pL
= 0
∂piH
∂pL
=
∂A(λ)
∂pL
E(λ)−A(λ) ∂E(λ)
∂pL
E(λ)2
rL −
∂C
∂pL
E(λ)− C ∂E(λ)
∂pL
E(λ)2
κλy∗
∂piH
∂pL
=
βλpH
(
( 1
σκ
(1 + β(1− 2pL + pH)) + 1)[κ2 + λ(1− β)]
)
E(λ)2
rL (83)
− −
(
1
σκ
(1 + β(1− 2pL + pH)) + 1
)
E(λ) + C
(
( 1
σκ
(1 + β(1− 2pL + pH)) + 1)[κ2 + λ(1− β)]
)
E(λ)2
κλy∗ (84)
(85)
Note that
∂E(λ)
∂pL
< 0 and ∂C
∂pL
< 0, as −2pL + pH > −σκ+1β − 1 for any 0 < pL, pH < 1. Thus, it is always the case that
∂piH
∂pL
< 0.
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Appendix C. Summary Statistics
Table A.1: Summary Statistics for Expected Inflation For Combined Confidence Measure
Political Orientation Inflation Targeting Gov. Trust Country
No. Obs. Total Right Left No Yes Trust Distrust Austria France Germany Hong Kong Italy Singapore Spain Switzerland UK
Short-Run Inflation
Not Confident 29,233 3.84∗∗∗ 3.74∗∗∗ 3.84∗∗∗ 5.08∗∗∗ 3.56∗∗∗ 3.83∗∗∗ 3.85∗∗∗ 3.39∗∗∗ 3.09∗∗∗ 3.53∗∗∗ 5.37∗∗⋄ 4.68∗∗∗ 4.59∗∗∗ 3.65⋄⋄⋄ 3.52∗∗∗ 2.75∗∗∗
Confident 21,246 2.81 2.75 3.04 4.39 2.51 2.91 2.45 2.84 2.62 2.44 5.06 3.30 4.00 3.69 1.99 1.98
Medium-Run Inflation
Not Confident 27,204 5.34∗∗∗ 5.13∗∗∗ 5.08∗∗∗ 7.29∗∗∗ 4.88∗∗∗ 5.24∗∗∗ 5.39∗∗∗ 5.09∗∗∗ 4.66∗∗∗ 5.21∗∗∗ 7.82∗∗∗ 5.41∗∗∗ 6.40∗∗∗ 4.48⋄⋄⋄ 5.39∗∗∗ 4.29∗∗∗
Confident 19,928 3.84 4.06 3.65 5.71 3.45 3.92 3.53 3.59 3.62 3.47 6.56 3.69 5.22 4.36 3.33 3.07
Gender Age Survey
No. Obs. Male Female Young Middle Old 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Short Run Inflation
Not Confident 29,233 3.33∗∗∗ 4.47∗∗∗ 4.59∗∗∗ 3.99∗∗∗ 3.37∗∗∗ 4.37∗∗∗ 4.07∗∗∗ 3.99∗∗∗ 4.10∗∗∗ 3.80∗∗∗ 3.84∗∗∗ 3.78∗∗∗ 3.45∗∗∗ 3.57∗∗∗ 3.66∗∗∗ 3.64∗∗∗
Confident 21,246 2.53 3.31 3.82 3.11 2.26 3.58 3.22 3.28 2.92 3.18 2.80 2.79 2.53 2.39 2.56 2.41
Medium Run Inflation
Not Confident 27,204 4.95∗∗∗ 5.82∗∗∗ 6.11∗∗∗ 5.48∗∗∗ 4.84∗∗∗ 5.68∗∗∗ 5.52∗∗∗ 5.64∗∗∗ 5.59∗∗∗ 5.44∗∗∗ 5.18∗∗∗ 5.20∗∗∗ 5.14∗∗∗ 5.11∗∗∗ 5.08∗∗∗ 5.12∗∗∗
Confident 19,928 3.55 4.35 4.81 4.03 3.32 4.40 4.14 4.19 4.19 3.94 3.79 3.85 3.58 3.61 3.64 3.49
Notes: The mean (median) of each group variable is compares between confident and not confident. For example, when testing Austria we are comparing the mean (median) of Not Confident to the mean (median) of Confident within Austria. ⋆,⋆⋆,
⋆ ⋆ ⋆ denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively, for the two sample t test. ⋄,⋄⋄, ⋄ ⋄ ⋄ denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively, for the Kruskal-Wallis equality of populations rank test.
Table A.2: Share of Confidence Combined Confidence Measure
Political Orientation Inflation Targeting Gov. Trust Country
Total Right Left No Yes Trust Distrust Austria France Germany Italy Spain EU Hong Kong Singapore Switzerland UK
Not Confident 61.98∗∗∗ 57.35∗∗∗ 71.58∗∗∗ 60.78∗∗∗ 62.19∗∗∗ 43.65∗∗∗ 83.26∗∗∗ 73.55∗∗∗ 77.54∗∗∗ 66.54∗∗∗ 65.88∗∗∗ 77.37∗∗∗ 71.77∗∗∗ 72.54∗∗∗ 48.55∗∗ 37.02∗∗∗ 40.29∗∗∗
Confident 38.02 42.65 28.42 39.22 37.81 56.35 16.74 26.45 22.46 33.46 34.12 22.63 28.23 27.46 51.45 62.98 59.71
Gender Age Survey
Total Male Female Young Middle Old 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Not Confident 61.98∗∗∗ 56.86∗∗∗ 67.24∗∗∗ 62.55∗∗∗ 63.11∗∗∗ 61.32∗∗∗ 69.67∗∗∗ 65.28∗∗∗ 69.24∗∗∗ 65.40∗∗∗ 61.62∗∗∗ 61.04∗∗∗ 61.54∗∗∗ 57.71∗∗∗ 58.16∗∗∗ 59.23∗∗∗ 57.17∗∗∗
Confident 38.02 43.14 32.76 37.45 36.89 38.68 30.33 34.72 30.76 34.60 38.38 38.96 38.46 42.29 41.84 40.77 42.83
Notes:The median of each group variable is compares between confident and not confident. For example, when testing Austria we are comparing the median of Not Confident to the median of Confident within Austria. *,**,*** denote significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively, for a one-sample test of proportion.
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Figure A.1. Perception of ECB’s inflation target in different euro-area countries.
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